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Shortly after arriving in Poland in August 1982, the 
author was confronted with the question: How does the Polish
United Workers Party (PUWP) maintain power? Everyone the 
author met, except the PUWP First Secretary at the 
JagielIonian University, had legitimate grievances against the 
Party. Workers were angry and disillusioned with the PUWP be­
cause its economic policies did not consistently improve their 
standard of living, its trade unions did not resolve their 
grievances, and its central leadership reclnded on Its promises 
to introduce economic and political reforms in 1956, 1970,
1976, and 1981.
Intellectuals were frustrated bv the fact that the Party 
did not allow independent thinkers to have access to state 
publishing agencies and thereby curtailed the free flow of 
ideas in Poland. Students and young people expressed little 
hope of obtaining jobs in t he i r areas of study or receiving 
their own apartment without waiting at least ten yea r s.
Farmers complained about the Party's favoritism in investing 
toward state and collective farms which results in fertilizer 
and capital equiment shortages in the private agricultural 
sector. Indeed these grievances, combined with the fact that 
the Party professes atheism in a predominately Roman Catholic 
nation and is often viewed as a political instrument of the 
Soviet Union, convinced the author that the PUWP is opposed 
by major segments of the Polish population.
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2Consequently, how does a political leadership which 
is opposed by major segments of the population stay in 
power? Although the Party’s use of the internal security 
forces and control of communications systems during martial 
law demonstrates that legitimacy Is not a crucial factor in 
maintaining power in Poland, the Polish authorities have 
demonstrated less military strength In past crises and emerged 
virtually unchanged. Except for personnel changes and pro­
mises of future reform, the power structure in Poland was 
basically unchanged after the worker and student revolts in 
1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976. The use of security forces is
relevant, however, a more thorough understanding of how 
the PUWP maintains power can be obtained from an examination 
of the Polish power structure itself.
The Polish Experience and Future Discussion Croup in 
its Report on the State of the Repuh1 1 c identified the five 
pillars of the power structure in Poland. The pillars of 
power are the representative bodies, the executive, the 
judiciary, the economy, and the mass media.
This thesis will demonstrate how the Party Controls the 
five pillars of power in Polish society and thereby how it 
maintains itself in power. It will be shown that the Party 
and State are one. Thus, the Party can call upon the vast 
political, economic, and military strength of the State to 
control the population and to crush its opposition to maintain 
itself in power. Although the Party*s control of society 
fails when the masses organize themselves against the State
3bureaucracy* these mass challenges have not been strong 
enough or did not want to overthrow the State and thus did 
not depose the Party from power. The Party is resistant to
reform because It fears that it will lose control of 
society. The PUWP maintains power bv controlling the State 
apparatus which permeates Polish society and influences all 
aspects of Polish life.
This study of how the PUWP maintains power consists of 
five chapters corresponding to the five pillars of power in 
Poland. The First and Second Chapter on the Sejm and the 
People’s Councils respectively, will show that through con­
sensus elections, democratic centralism, the paralleling 
party bureaucracy, and other devices, the Party effectively 
makes the representative bodies its instrument for legitimizing 
its policies. The Party controls the State administration, 
discussed in Chapter 2, primarily through the nomenklatura 
system and the delimitation of its powers through administrative 
laws. The Party’s control of the State administration enables 
it to control the centrally administered Polish economy and 
an apparatus which permeates Polish society, organizes it in 
a hierarchical fashion, and facilitates the implementation 
of its policies. Through its control of the State*, the Party 
controls the military and internal security forces which it 
can use to crush external and internal threats to its power.
By appointing loyal judges and maintaining other control 
devices, the Party can pressure the Polish judiciary into 
punishing its political opponents. The Party’s control of the 
judiciary is discussed in Chapter 4. The Party controls the
mass media, the subject of Chapter 5, by appointing its
editors and guiding them through central directives and
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recommendations. The Party controls the mass media to 
mobilize he population for the implementation of its policies 
and to soc i a 1 I z e t he popu1 at i on po 1 i t i c a 11v Into accep t1ng 
its rule. Throughout this text, it will be shown that the 
Party’s control of the economy, namely the control of access to 
state Jobs and the distribution of go0rjs anc| services, enables 
the Party to maintain an army of loyal individuals who are 
economically motivated to keep the Party In power.
CHAPTKR 1: I'lM- SK.IM
Since they were put into power by the Red Army and embrace 
Marxism-Leninism, the Polish Communists have been opposed 
by major segments of the Polish population. Yet the modern 
industrialization policies the PUWP is pursuing, partly to in­
crease its legitimacy, require the active participation of all 
the segments of the Polish population. The Party cannot 
implement these policies by force since that would he counter­
productive if not impossible. Moreover, the? Party cannot 
simply approve these policies at its Congresses or Central 
Committee meetings and expect the Polish population to accept 
and implement them. Consequently, the Party uses the Sejm, 
the traditional symbol of the sovereign Polish state and 
expressor of the will of the Polish people, to bring alienated 
sectors back into the polity, legitimize its policies, and 
thereby facilitate t It e i r implementation.
Although the Party must use a deliberative body like the 
Sejm to legitimize its policies, the PUWP retains its monopoly 
on policy formulation in Poland. Modelski, Piekalkiewicz, 
and many other students of Polish politics demonstrate in no 
uncertain terms that policy initiative lies with the P U W P . ^
The most powerful party organ, t lie Politburo, solicits infor­
mation from the executive Party Secretariat and local Party 
organizations and develops policies. "The Sejm transforms the 
will of the Party into laws enacted by "representatives" of 
the people.
After substantiating the argument that the PUWP is opposed
6by major segments of Polish society which forces the Party 
to use the Sejm to legitimize its policies, the author will show
that the Party controls over the Sejm effectively reduce its 
work to considering issues on the periphery of power in Poland 
and to rubberstamping the Party’s policies. It will be further 
argued that by maintaining the Sejm, the Party attains three 
goals in one step. First, the party has developed an elaborate 
system for reviewing and occass ional ly improving its policies 
and the work of the government. Second, the Party has produced 
an image of democracy, however limited, and thus reduced the 
blatantness of its control over the PRP. Third, the PUWP 
has gained some legitimacy by allowing limited participation 
in the development of Poland and by validating and sanctioning 
its own position in Poland by law.
OPPONENTS
The PUWP cannot claim to be the legitimate ruling Party 
of Poland because it is willingly accepted by the Polish 
people. The PUWP was placed into power when the Red Army 
installed a group of Soviet-trained Polish Comm u n i s t s , the 
Lublin Committee, into power after it liberated Eastern Europe 
from Nazi occupation in 1944. The Communists consolidated 
power in Poland after winning a civil war against the Polish 
non-communist forces, such as the Armia Krajowa (AK), anc 
fixing the national elections of 1947. In addition to opposing
7the PUWP because of the ruthless way it came to power, Polish 
farmers and Roman Catholics view the Party’s ideology as hostile 
to their interests, and since 1956 the PolLsh workers have 
become increasingly disllusioned with th° PUWP’s leadership.
The PUWP embraces Marxism-Leninism which calls for the 
elimination of all private property to eliminate class conflict 
and to move societies toward the higher modes of production 
under socialism and communism. Perhaps more than farmers 
elsewhere, the Polish farmer is tied to his land through 
love and economic necessity. Moreover, all his life he has 
heard the warnings of the older generations that losing one’s 
land is tantamount to losing one’s independence and being 
subject to the abuse of others as witnessed by the harsh 
Polish serfdom. Despite the PUWP’s claims that it will not 
collectivize Polish argiculture, the Polish farmer is not 
convinced since the Party favors collective and state farms 
in its investment policies. The Polish farmer will always 
have the fear of losing his land in his heart and will con­
tinuously remind his offspring of this danger.
The PUWP’s Marxist-Leninist ideology is also th .atoning 
to the predominately Roman Catholic Polish people. Marxism- 
Leninism is based on materialism. Mao-Tse-Tung defined material­
ism as : ’’There is nothing in the universe except matter
in motion.”3 From this it follows that there is no God.
8Lenin said: "atheism is a natural and inseparable portion
of Marxism, of the theory and practice of scientific 
soc ia1 ism.
Roman Catholicism and Roman Catholic Church enabled the 
Polish people to survive without a state for over 120 years 
despite the Russification and Germanization programs conducted 
by Poland's occupiers. Thus being Polish is virtually 
synonymous with being Roman Catholic. To attack a Pole's 
faith is to attack his nation.
Since 1956, the Polish worker has become increasingly 
disillusioned with the PUWP despite its claims to be the 
"party of the working class." Many workers believe that 
the Party does not represent the workers and its trade unions 
do not fight for worker interests. Excluding the rank and 
file, PUWP members do not live the life of an average Polish 
blue-collar worker. Most PUWP members are university educated, 
white collar workers or professionals earning sufficient 
incomes or weilding sufficient clout to ease the vagaries of 
living in a demand economy. The official trade unions do 
not resolve legitimate worker grievances. Instead, they are 
instruments of the State administration for insuring the 
fulfillment of the central economic plan.
The Polish workers are also angry or disillusioned with 
their political leadership because they have failed to con­
sistently improve their standard of living and have broken
9many promises. Since 1956, the Party’s economic policies 
have not consistently maintained let alone improved the 
worker’s standard of living. Moreover, the PUWP has con­
sistently rescinded or undermined the economic and political 
reforms the workers and intellectuals had obtained through 
their protests and blood in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980 and 
1981. Most workers feel that the Party has done a poor job 
of protecting their interests.
OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES AND SEJM
Since its ruthless ascension to power and ideology pro­
hibit it from enjoying popular legitimacy, the PUWP has tried 
to build its legitimacy through actions which are in the 
interests of the Polish nation. Thus the PUWP is pursuing 
rapid industrialization policies to raise Poland’s standard 
of living and stature as a world economy. Among other things, 
the PUWP claims to be working toward providing each Pole with 
a job, a primary education, and adequate medical services.
Such developmental policies require the cooperation of all 
segments of the nation. Modern industrialization policies 
require the active participation of the members of society 
for successful implementation. Force and terror stifle the 
creative thinking needed to harness the forces of modern 
technology for societal development. The PUWP realizes that 
its policies will not reach fruition if Poles do not feel they
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are meaningfully contributing to their enactment and if the 
cooperation of alienated segments of society is not enlisted. 
Political realities force the PUWP to recognize that there 
are alienated groups in Polish society and that their co­
operation must be enlisted to build socialist Poland.
"Since there are vertical stratifications in Poland at 
the present stage of development, the PUWP recognizes two other 
political parties."^ The PUWP is the largest political party 
in Poland. The PUWP claims to represent the workers of Polish 
society. It also claims to he guiding force of Polish society.
In July 1981, the Party had 2,870,000 members and candidate 
members . ^
The non-Marxist United Peasants Party (UPP) represents 
the interests of rural Poland. Although socialist, the UPP 
is devoid of Marxist materialism, which makes it tolerable 
for the devoutly Catholic Polish peasants. In 1981, he 
UPP had 447,000 members.^
The smallest legal political party, the Pemocr.it i< P.irt 
(DP), is a non-Marxist organization representing the i: t llctuals, 
artisans, and private enter preneurs in Pol rind. In 1 8 ' , the
DP had 113,000 memhers.®
The PUWP recognizes the other two parti e • i use thev
recognize its leading role an do not chn i*ng i  ^ power.
Moreover, "the Party controls a inflne e s t e i a t i on a 1
leadership of the other two irt i . e r 11 a > . i < vi> the
doc i1i ty of the lower echelons." - \ * , gn I zi ng iwu o t h e r
political parties, the PUWP effectively limits the Jega! 
recourses of action its opponents may use to influence its 
rule. All other political organizations not recognized by 
the PUWP are illegal and can be treated as subversive uhder the 
law.
The PUWP and the other political parti es come together 
in the Sejm, the Polish symbol of par 1 iamen t a r v deni or racy 
to formulate policies for the building of socialism in Poland. 
The Sejm is the powerful symbol of Poland's democratic past. 
During the 18th centruy, the Sejm was a rigorous deliberative 
body which checked the power of the elected monarch. When 
the Sejm approved a policy, it represented the will of the 
people because each delegate had the power to veto it.
Currently, the Sejm is an elective, unicameral parliament 
composed of 460 delegates elected for a 4 year term. Article 
20 (1) of the Constitution of the Polish Peoples Republic 
(PPR) adopted in 1952 as amended in 1972, states that the 
Sejm is the highest body of state authority. It functions 
include passing laws and exercising control over the work 
of organs of state authority and administration (Art. 20(3)); 
adopting the national economic plan (Art, 24(1)) and the state 
budget (Art. 24(2)); and forming committees to investigate 
various matters (Art. 26).*^
Despite the symbolic and formal powers of the Sejm, the 
PUW! comr* i the Sejm and uses it to legitimize its policies.
T PUWP ont the Sejm bv controlling its membership,
12
planning its sessions, and conducting its daily activities 
through the Council of State. The PUWP also controls the 
Sejm*s committee structure by appointing its chairmen.
These controls reduce the effectiveness of the Sejm and make its 
work symbolic .
CONSENSUS ELECTIONS
The strengths and weaknesses of organizations are largely 
determined by their membership. Therefore, an effective way 
for the PUWP to control the Sejm is to control who is selected 
to serve as its delegates. Although the Sejm is an elected 
body, elections really do not determine the composition of the 
Sejm. In Poland, all elections are consensus elections.^
Thus, all the political parties recognize the leadership of the 
PUWP and do not engage in election battles. Since 1973, all 
political parties are required by law to present a single 
slate of candidates for each multi-mandate district in Poland. 
Thus, "the voters are given some choice, but only--to para­
phrase Marx-with regard to which of the communist-sponsored 
candidates will represent them."^
Consequently, it is the nomination process which determines 
the composition of the Sejm. Article 100 of the Constitution 
states that only political and social organizations of working 
people can nominate candidates for the Sejm and local Peopl e's 
Councils. Article 33 of the 1956 Election Law further limits * 
the right to nominate candidates to the governing bodies of
political and social organizations, ^  Since most legal 
organisations, except for religious groups, are led or 
infiltrated by PUWP members, the nominees are safe.^
Since 1952. the various political and social organizations 
have nominated a single slate of candidates for each electoral 
district. Very little is known about the nomination decision- 
making process. J Apparently, the various nominating groups 
work through their local Front of National Unity organization 
( F J N )  in drawing up their district's slate, Officially the 
F J N  is an alliance of Poland's three political parties facil­
itating inter party cooperation and harmony in the pursuit 
of socialist programs for Poland. "tn reality it is not an 
alliance, but an umbrella organization through which the PUWP 
supervises the political participation of various political 
g r o u p s . After determining that the candidates are safe 
and that each party has the agreed upon quota of candidates, 
the FJN turns the slate over to the State Electoral Commission 
which is responsible for tne mechanics of the elections. ^  
"The composition of the Sejm, then, is a consequence of 
the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party. "1® "Identical 
results for the elections of 1965, 1969, and 1972 show clearly
that the distribution of Sejm seats results from a quota 
allotment established by the PUWP rather than i nun a genuine 
electoral contest. Over the course of the Sejm's seven 
terms (1952-1976), each party's strength within the Sejm has 
been stable. The average share of seats per party and non- 
party organizations over the seven terms is as follows:
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PUWP 5b %, UPP 21%, DP 9%, non-party groups 11%.20 Since 
the elections of March 1980, there are 261 PUWP delegates 
in the S e j m . ^ * The UPP has 113 delegates^ and the DP 37 
delegates.^3 The non-party organizations had 49 delegates 
in the Sejm in 1980, five of whom represent Catholic organ­
izations not recognized by the Roman Catholic Church.^4 By 
controlling the electoral process, t lu* Par tv carefully selects 
who will serve the Sejm and insures that It will const i tut ie 
a majority of the Sejm.
Planned or unplanned, the composition of the Sejm 
facilitates PUWP control over the Sejm. The Sejm is composed 
of well educated, white collar workers in the 40-59 age group. 
Piekalkiewicz argues that older, well educated, and established 
deputies are likely to respond positively to central pressures 
and follow the Party line.^5 The characteristics of the deputies 
and how they facilitate PUWP control over the deputies is discussed 
below.
The Sejm has been composed of 40-50 year old administrative/ 
managerial or professional deputies. Over the Sejm's seven 
terms, 67 to 75 percent of the Sejm's deputies have been in the 
40-5 9 age group. ^ 6 During the seventies, approximately 54 percent 
of the deputies held white collar occupations, 6 percent were 
managers of state owned enterprises, and 6 percent were employed 
in professional occupations. The two occupational groups 
comprising a majority of the Polish workforce, the workers
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and peasants, have had only 17 and 15 percent respectively 
of the deputies representing their interests.28 The 
statistics for the educational attainment of the deputies 
confirms their occupational sophistication. In 1976, S5 
percent of the deputies had completed higher education, 
whereas in the Polish population over the age of 14 only 2.8 
percent had completed higher education.^ Finally, during 
the Sejm's past two terms (VI-72-76, VII-76-80), the turnover 
rate for deputies has been 4 0%. ^
As in the past, the Sejm is composed of the Who's Who 
in Poland. Simon and Olson remark that the Sejm may be more 
important for who is in it than for what it does,^ The 
Sejm's delegates have spent many years building their careers. 
Most of the delegates are administrative or managerial 
employees dependent on the state for their economic livelihood. 
The secret police can threaten to cut off his economic 
livelihood should the deputy deviate from the Party line.
"They may be annoyed by the general economic mismanagement, 
bureaucratic stupidity, delays in the administrative process, 
and lack of response to their views on the part of the Communist 
leadership but they are not likely to endanger their relatively 
secure and privileged position by open revolt against the 
establishment of which they are part and pa r c e l ."^2
LaPalombara states that the high turnover rate in the 
Polish Sejm is consistent with the high turnover rates 
of other Communist par l i ament s . ^  jn the case of the Supreme
16
Soviet of the USSR, Kanet has argued that the CPSU may en­
courage high turnover in the Supreme Soviets to keep the 
experiences of delegates limited and thereby transfer effective 
power into the hands of experienced, dependable politicians.^ 
This argument is not supported by the data in the case of the 
Polish Sejm. Assuming committee chairman are experienced 
reliable politicians, the turnover of committee chairmen is
3 Shigh and there is no pattern of seniority in the Polish Sejm. 
Simon and Olson attribute the high turnover in the Polish 
Sejm to an attempt by the PUWP leadership to increase political 
communication and participation by citizens possessing various 
interests.^
SESSIONS
During its full plenary sessions, the Sejm performs a 
number of formalities which reduces its time for debating 
and initiating policy. The Sejm meets in full plenary 
sessions between 10 and 12 days annually. To the extent 
that the Polish Sejm is similar to the Supreme Soviet, the 
delegates listen to various important party and government 
officials report on past activities and future tasks. Other 
speeches include reports on the fulfillment of the economic 
plan, its shortfalls, and guidelines for future plans.
Lengthy reports on the budget are presented as well. Further, 
much time is spent considering numerous amendments to new
17
plans and budgets during their second reading. Terry has 
found that the Sejm also rubbers tamps many bills. On 
March 9, 1972 the Sejm approved 16 such bi 11s . ^  The Sejm's 
formal activities leave little time for legislating.
Virtually everything that will be discussed during a 
Sejm's session is planned beforehand. The Sejm's presidium, 
the leaders of party delegate clubs, and representatives of 
the non-party groups form the Counil of Seniors. The PUWP- 
domlnated Council of Seniors prepares the program for the 
entire session, structures the debates by determining how 
much ti i? will he spent on topics, and largely determines 
which delegates will be assigned to the Sejm's twenty-two 
standing commi ttees , ^
Subsequently, the delegate-club leaders return to their 
organizations and divide their assigned tasks among their 
membership. The clubs determine which members will report 
on legislation and which members will participate in the 
debates. Ofentimes how the group will vote on various issues 
is predetermined. Strict party discipline requires that the 
delegates submit to the club's decisions.
The Sejm's plenary sessions strictly follow the pre­
determined agenda and the Marshall of the Sejm has recourse 
to disciplinary measures to insure order. Speakers on the 
agenda are allowed to speak only twice on a specific issue.
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The first time they are allotted 30 minutes and the second
time 10 minutes. Speakers must keep to the point of the
discussion. After two warnings to keep to the point, the
Marshall can expel the speaker for the day if he strays off
the point again. The deputy cannot appeal the Marshall’s 
4 0judgement.
Izydor Modelski found that any independent criticism 
voiced by the Sejm’s deputies is focused on the technical 
problems of legislation and not on its fundamental principles.^ 1 
Generally, the reason for the first reading of a bill is to 
start debates on its underlying assumptions. Modelski found 
that debates never followed the first reading.^ He also 
argues that deputies are not likely to criticize bills on the 
Sejm floor if they can do so during private committee meetings 
or if they know they can be disciplined for their remarks. 
Articles 1, 10, and 12 of the Rules of the Sejm empower the
Presidium or Rules and Credentials Committees with the right 
to oust a deputy for ’’violating his vow to work for unity and 
progress of socialism in the PRP" and for not filling the 
duties of a deputy.^ Clearly these rules are vague and invite 
a broad interpretation. Fear of discipline may temper a
i
deputy's remarks during plenary sessions.
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SEJM COMMITTEES
Polish scholars argue that the Sejm's effectiveness 
should not be judged by the number of days it meets in 
full plenary session,^ They argue that the Sejm's most 
important work is performed by its standing committees. "The 
committees are said to provide specialized expertise, increased 
opportunities for involved discussions, and the best setting 
for thorough deliberation."45 Burda claims that the committees 
play momentous roles in legislation and are oftentimes called 
"little parliaments."^6 Thus, an examination of how the 
PUWP controls the Sejm's committees is relevant.
The committees offices of chairman and vice-chairman 
are usually shared among the parties proportionally in West 
European parliaments. The PUWP, however, has controlled 
a disproportionate share of the chdirmanship in the Sejm.
The PUWP does allow the other political parties to chair 
committees relevant to their interests and to hold a 
disproportionate number of vice-chairmanships.^
During the VII term of the Polish Sejm (1976-80), the 
PUWP controlled 15, or 68 percent of the 22 standing committees 
while its proportion of delegates in the Sejm was 57 percent.^® 
Not surprisingly, the PUWP controlled the most important 
standing committees during this term: Budget and Economic
Plan, Legislation, and National Defense. Except for the
recently created Legislative Committee, the PUWP has con­
trolled the aforementioned committees rontinously as well 
as the two committees on industry and the Seats-Rules Committee 
which considers the organization and composition of the Parlia- 
men t itself.^
Most of the committee chairman hold important Party, 
government, or social positions. Thus, through overlapping 
leadership the Party controls the Sejm ami other organizations. 
Of the PUWP's 15 chairman, during the Sejm's 1976-80 term,
9 were members of the PUWP's Central Committee. Of the 
remaining 6, four chairman held salaried positions within 
the PUWP's administrative apparatus. Moreover, six of the 
PUWP chairman were parliamentary officers and four held leader­
ship positions in social organizations.50 Clearly, members 
of the Party's Central Committee and leaders of social organi­
zations have proven their loyalty to the Party and will strive 
to insure that the Party line is followed. Modelski argues 
.'.hat one best sees the interlocking directorates at work in 
the Politburo. "As Politburo members they make policy; as 
Secretariat members some of them see to it that the policy 
is carried out by the party apparatus; as members of the 
Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and the Sejm, 
they legalize policy in the form of laws and decrees."51
Given the stature of committee chairman, it is expected 
that they will dominate committe meetings. The chairman, 
together with the Committee's presidium, plans and organizes
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the comm itte ' s work, , ets m* ting agendas, and keeps the 
Sejm’s presidium informed of its work. Modelski found that 
committee meetings are dominated by a few persons. Usually, 
committee members are given a copy of an annual or other 
report and the chairman, representatives of the government,
additional experts, and the committee reporter lead the
5 7d iscuss ion .
The autonomy of the committees and their power to initiate 
policies is checked by the fact that they spend most of their 
time considering policies initiated elsewhere. Sara!) Terry 
points out a trend in the work of the Sejm and its committees. 
During the 1950’s the Sejm was considering a multitude of 
decrees issued by the Council of State and initiating few 
laws itself. In 1956, the Sejm approved 161 decrees of the 
Council of State and initiated only 42 laws on its own,^ 
During the 1970s, the number of decrees issued by the Council 
of State was substantially reduced. Instead, the committee 
were reviewing the myriad of legislative proposals submitted 
by the government.
Modelski found that in the limited instances when the 
Sejm or its committees initiated policies, the policies 
showed concern for the common man in Poland.^ The Sejm 
initiated policies in areas on the periphery of power in 
Poland such as family 1 iw, social security rights, and 
inheritance rights. Modelski concluc. ; that the committees
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are free in areas only where there is no PUWP established 
pol icy.^
There are a number of other factors which weaken the 
Sejm’s committees and thereby limit their ability to seriously 
challange the policy initiative monopoly of the PUWP. First,
Sejm committees ha*".' neither a permanent professional staff 
to help them with their work nor a legislative referral service.3** 
The Sejm's library resources are limited. Thus, the committees 
must rely on the government for information while considering 
its proprosals or initiating legislation. Although members 
of Parliament in Great Britain do not have support staffs 
either, they can check the governments information against 
information which they obtain from lobbying groups and the 
free mass media. Theoretically, there are no private interests 
in Poland only collective interests thus few lobbying groups. 
Moreover, the mass media is controlled by the Party as will 
be shown in Chapter 5. Thus, the deputies do not have an 
independent iniormation base to enable them to check government 
proposals and initiate policy.
Second, the deputies hold other full-time jobs. Deputies 
are expected to hold full time Jobs to keep them in contact with 
the people they represent. Although this may encourage the 
deputy to solicit grass roots opinion, he may iind that he does 
not have the time to develop the expertise to review and understand
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the complex legislation of an industrial state. Third, 
the various powers given to the committees to hoi hem obtain 
information relevant to their work are inadequate. "There 
is no legal way to force a department to comply with the one 
month time limit for returning desiderata,"^ Fourth, some 
areas are simply off limits to committees. '’The Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the National Defense Committee do not
C Qcheck on the work of their ministries. In conclusion,
"the PUWP uses the closed committee meetings to find out the 
truth about the merits or demerits of it proposals and to 
correct flaws in them"^
The Council of State further limits the Sejm's power.
Since the Sejm only meets about 10 days annually, the Council 
of State performs its daily functions. The Council of State 
is composed of 17 members elected by the Sejm. Typically, the 
PUWP lias 10 members on the Council of State. ^  The Chairman 
of the Council of State is usually a Politburo member.
The Council of State has the power of issuing decrees 
with the force of law. Since the subsequent approval of 
the Sejm is insured, this PUWP-controlled State organ lias 
virtually as much power as the Sejm. Upon the proposal of the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Council of State 
may appoint or recall anv member of the Polish government.
It may declare a state of war or martial law. It may issue 
decrees binding on the citizenry. It appoints Polish judges
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for terms of five years and may recall them for failing to
execute the policies of the State. The Council or State also
performs functions similar to the Head of State: it appoints
or recalls ambassadors, ratifies or denounces International
treaties, confers destinctions and honorary titles, and grants
or rejects Pollsh citizenship.
Further, the Council of State exercises ultimate power
l ft 1over the local units of State authority, the Peoples Councils. 1 
The Council of State can order or invalidate a Peoples Council 
election. It can lay down in detail the tasks of a Peopled 
Council or transfer its tasks to a council at a higher geograph­
ical level. The Council of State may annul the resolutions 
of or dissolve any Peopled Council.
CONCLUSION
Polish, as well as other scholars, argue that the Sejm
has become a more representative institution and that it
influences the development and execution of the PUWP's
policies. Wiatr argues that Polish voters have some choice
among candidates for the Sejm, since Sejm elections are no
ft olonger safe but consensus elections. Simon and Olson's
analysis of the Sejm leads them to conclude that the Sejm
does have the capability of influencing policy and the
potential for developing a broader role in the decisional 
ftprocess. ' Finally, Izydor Model ski laboriously points
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out that many of the Sejm’s laws show concern for the common 
man In Poland. Indeed, the Sejm’s activities have been 
strengthened during the past legitimacy crises. The Sejm 
has been able to maintain some of these powers even after 
the PUWP has reversed democratic trends because it felt it had 
regained control over the environment.
Although the Sejm may have become more representative 
and has improved some PUWP legislation, the PUWP uses various 
controls to restrict the Sejm’s autonomy. The Party controls 
the Sejm by controlling its membership, planning its sessions, 
appointing its committee chairmen, and conducting its daily 
activities through the Council of State. These controls 
effectively exclude the Sejm from considering issues of central 
Importance to the Party’s control of the economy and maint­
enance of power.
Tit at the Sejm does not consider central economic and political 
issues is illustrated by the fact that the Sejm’s delegates 
did not know that the Party and its State administration intended 
to raise meat prices in July 1976. The demand for meat, especially 
pork, is very high in Poland and its price substantially 
influences the workers’ standard of living. Meat price increases 
had triggered worker strikes, demonstrations, and violence 
before 1976. The Party did not warn the population of the 
1976 meat price increases or consult the Sejm on how to intro­
duce the increases and by how much. Perhaps the Party hoped
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that when the workers discovered that meat prices had gone 
up they would accept them as given. When the government 
unexpectedly announced that meat prices hid gone up, which 
immediately triggered worker unrest, one Sejm delegate 
exclaimed: "You see, our representative institutions really
are democrat ic--even the deputies to the Sejm didn't know what 
was going on until the last minute,
The Polish Sejm is a symbol of parliamentary democracy.
It helps the PUWP bring alienated groups back into the polity 
to implement modernization policies. The symbol of the Sejm 
reduces the blatantness of the Party's rule by making it 
appear that the PRP is governed on the basis of objective laws 
formulated by the people. The Sejm legitimizes the PUWP's 
policies.
The local representative bodies, the Peopled Councils, 
play a role similar to that of the Sejm. Through devices 
similar to those it uses to control the Sejm, the PUWP turns 
the local councils into rubberstamping mechanisms for its local 
development policies. At most, the local councils consider 
issues on the periphery of power in Poland. Although the 
Sejm and Peoples' Councils play symbolic roles, the Party 
uses the State administration, discussed in Chapter 3, to 
implement its policies. The Party's control of the pervasive 
State administration enables it to Insure that its policies are 
implemented and that it maintains in control of Polish society.
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CHAPT KK 2 THE LOCAL COUNCILS
Like the Sejm, the local People's Councils at most deal with 
issues on the periphery of power in Poland or at worst their work is 
symbolic. Democratic centralism, the paralleling Party and state bur­
eaucracy, and administrative laws and procedure's prevent the local 
councils from being effective representative bodies which formulate 
policy. The net effect of these factors Is to transfer policy formulation 
and decision-making powers to the local administrator and Party secretary. 
How one-man local governance, like one-man industrial management, facil­
itates Party control over local affairs is the subject of the next chapter.
This chapter will provide evidence for the claim that mocratic 
centralism, the paralleling bureaucracies, and the administrative laws 
regulating the councils make them devoid of real power. Although the 
local councils are devoid of power, the Party maintains them to increase 
its legitmacy by symbolically .allowing popular participation in local 
governance, to gain information and sound out public opinion, to politic­
ally socialize the councilors, and to assist the Party bureaucracy in 
supervising the executive branch. Before offering evidence In support 
of these arguments, however, a discussion of the official purpose, organ­
ization, and functions of the local representative bodies is relevant.
Formally, the People's Councils are charged with meeting the needs 
of their constituents, clarifying the PU '"*'s policies, mobilizing con- 
stituants to meet state goals and priorities, and strengthening tin- 
security and defense of People's Poland. In addition to supervising the 
local executive branches, the councils socially control other organizations 
within their area and serve as a conduit for information between the central 
authorities and the people.
-30-
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Since 1975, the ai representative and executive bodies in Poland 
have been organized n a two-tier framework. The smaller organizational 
unit called the commune (gmina) Is represented by the Commune 
council and administered by the commune manager (naczelnik). The larger 
and more populous province (wojewodztwo), composed of many communes, is 
represented by the Province council and administered by the executive 
(wojewodz). Prior to 1975, local representation in Poland was organized 
along a three-tier structure. The Gierek leadership found that this 
framework was unresponsive to peoples' needs and contributed to the rioting 
in 1970 and consequently needed reform.
Since 1972, Poland has been divided into 2365 communes represented
by an equal number of commune councils.^  Kach commune is composed of
small towns and rural areas averaging 130 square kilometers in size and
27,600 inhabitants. All residents 18 years old and over, regardless of 
how long they have been residing in the commune, can participate in 
electing the commune council by secret balloting.^ On average, the
commune councils are composed of 60 counci linen elected for a four year
Lterm.
Officially, the commune councils are vested with significant 
responsibilities.^ The commune council is responsible for adopting a 
local economic plan and budget. The commune council is empowered to 
assess and collect a turnover tax on local industry, a land tax on local 
proprietors, and luxury taxes. The commune councils are also empowered 
to examine local investments, enter intercommune investment projects, 
and dispose of their budget surpluses.
Moreover, the commune councils are to agitate for increased 
agricultural production and social work. They also socially control 
organlzatldps in their areas. Although the groups the commune councils
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socially control are not formally under their jurisdiction, the councils 
ar3 responsible for insuring that their assigned groups follow state 
policy, enact central directives, and contribute to the development 
of socialism in Poland. Any deviations are to be reported to the central 
authorities.
There are 49 provinces in People’s Poland. The provinces range 
in size from 3,703 square kilometers to 12,332 square kilometers.^ Population 
size In the provinces also varies considerably; from 224,400 inhabitants 
to 3,400,000 inhabitants. The provinces vary in size and population 
because each is to be a micro-region or have a homogenous socio-economic 
profile. Some provinces do specialize in selected sectors of
industry, agriculture, or tourism. Among other things, this micro-region 
organizational schema is to facilitate the province councils’ formulation 
of local economic plans and budgets. Moreover, the 120 member province 
councils coordinate the activities of their commune councils, maintain 
contact with industrial associations, help coordinate local investment 
projects, and socially control other groups.
DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM
Oftentimes il is assumed that democratic centralism is the principle 
which only organizes communist parties. "It is, however, the principle 
binding together the entire Communist state.1 Stefan Rozmaryn, Professor 
of Constitutional Law at Warsaw University, states the principle unuer- 
lying the system of People’s Councils in the PRP is known as democratic 
centralism. ’’Its content is the tendency to assure, wherever necessarv,
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planned central leadership through the supreme organs of State authority 
(Sejmv and the Council of State) and State administration (Council of 
Ministers and Ministries), while at the same time aiming to promote a 
maximum of initiative and freedom of action on the part of the People’s
QCouncils of all levels and their organs
In theory, democratic centralism means that central and local 
authorities participate in the formulation of policy and only final 
policy decisions are binding on everyone. Theoretically, the local 
councils and administrators join the Sejm, Council of State, and the 
Council of Ministers in formulating state policy. On1v after the Sejm 
or Council of State formally approves a policy is their decision binding 
on the local councils and administrators.
In practice, however, the centralism aspect of democratic centralism 
dominates the relationship between the central and local authorities.
For example, tl ere is little policy debate and formulation in the local 
councils— because counciImen ha^ /e other ful 1-time jobs, thus little time, 
and no research staff to help them formulate policies. Consequently, 
they rely on the local administrator to provide them with Information 
and to submit policy proposals. The administrator prepares these 
proposals obeying central directives and heeding the wishes of higher 
authorities and the local aktiv. Thus, the local councils rubberstamps 
policies that have been largely formulated at a higher level. "In 
practice in the structure of the councils, the principle of democratic 
centralism is employed as a tool by which obedience to the central 
government Is insured, permitting at the same time the use of local 
initiative and taking account of regional pecularitits.
Obedience to central directives is insured when the
directives explicitly state what the central authorities 
expect of the local bodies. Obedience is less likely when 
the central authorities send conflicting signals to the 
local organs. For example, conflicting signals initially 
characterized Gomulka’s policy of decentralizing effective 
control of local government from the ministerial to the 
commune level in 1959-60, By 1959, the devolution of 
power from the ministerial level to the province level was 
complete. However, the provinces began to resist the de­
volution of power to the commune level in 1960, Some of 
this resistence stemmed from the fact the province leaders did 
not want to give up their power or transfer their staffs from 
the province capital to the less attractive commune towns.
Most of the resistance was caused by conflicting central 
signals.
Although the Party resolutions and administrative laws 
said that the commune was to play the dominant role in local 
administration, the province leaders were not convinced that 
they would not be held responsible for the shortfalls of the 
commune administrators. The commune administrators drast­
ically needed support staff, yet the central authorities 
were not providing economic incentives for staff to move to 
the commune level. Moreover, some central leaders, more so 
than Gotnulka, were concerned that the devolution of power 
to the communes might threaten the Party’s control of local 
government. Only after explicitly restating that the commune
was to play the dominant role in local administration in a 
joint Council of State and Council of Ministers resolution 
on June 28, 1963; offering economic incentives for the pro­
vince staff to move to the communes; barraging the councils 
with regulations; and mobilizing the public was the decent­
ralization policy implemented.
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"There is no sphere of local government activitv which could be 
completely free by irrevocable right of directives of the central 
authority should it desire to excerise fully its perogative Impregnated 
by the logic of democratic centralism,"*® Through the principle of 
democratic centralism, higher authorities limit a local council’s power 
to formulate its economic plan and budget, elect its own presidium, and 
plan its activities.
There is general and specific evidence which indicates that the 
central authorities largely perform the local council's task of formulating 
its economic plan and budget. A review of the PRP's economic history 
reveals that whenever the Polish economy is not performing as well as 
they planned, the central authorities resort to increased central!zation 
and commands to aid the economy. Indeed, these centralization responses 
to economic crises have been factors contributing to every political 
crisis in Poland. George Blazyca argues that even during thaws when the 
volume of central directives, recommendations, and reports had been reduced, 
they were still numerous enough to permit strict limitations on local 
autonomy and initiative.** Obligatory central directives limit the 
council’s economic plan formulation powers.
More specifically, Tarkowski found that in the Zwlerz Commune the 
local aktiv in consultation with higher authorities, and not Che local 
council, formulated the economic plan. Tarkowski based his conclusions 
on the Introduction to the 1973 Economic Plan for the Commune of Zwlerz 
which states: "This plan was formulated by the commune aktiv and
agricultural circles on the basis of directives sent by the Province 
People's Council, the electoral program, the long term economic plan, and 
commune statistical d a ta ."12 The local aktiv which formulated the plan 
is composed of the chairman of the Zwlerz People’s Council the local
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PUWP secretary, the manager, and the secretary of the commune adminis­
tration.
Tarkovski's research supplies further evidence that the Zwlerz 
councilors did not contribute to the formulation of economic plans and 
budgets. Tarkovski found that the council's discussion of the plan 
and other matters lacked direction.^ He found that the councilors' 
questions vere often petty and personal. The councilors, did not question 
the underlying premises of the plan and other policy proposals. Tarkovski 
observed that the chairman did not guide the discussion and when asked 
questions answered as if representing the administration. Intuitively, 
these observations suggest that the councilors were not familiar with the 
plan and were only formally considering the plan after the fact.
Piekalkiewicz*s observations of local council sessions are more 
critical.1 ' He found that the councilors paid little attention to the 
session's speeches, reports, and discussion. He found the councilman 
constantly talking among themselves or leaving the room to partake of 
the food and beverages provided. Piekalkiewicz argues that councilors 
contribute little to the formulation of the local economic plan. To 
summarize, central directives, aktlv preparation of the plan, and the lack 
of councilor preparation for plan discussions limit the council's power 
to formulate its local plan and budget.
The PUWP uses the principle of democratic centralism and the 
nomenklatura system to limit the local councils' right to elect their 
own leadership. Formally, each council is to elect its own presidium 
which is responsible for managing the council's affairs and planning its 
sessions. The presidium consists of a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary,
. •
and other presidium members. However, the position of Chairman of the Pro­
vince People's Council is on the nomenklatura of the PUWP Central 
Committee Secretariat, while the position of Chairman of the Commune 
People's Council is on the nomenklatura ot the provincial PUWP Central 
Committee.^ The conflict of filling one position both electorally 
and through the nomenklatura system is resolved in favor of the Party 
nominating a single candidate to fill the position. For example, the 
provincial PUWP Central Committee will nominate a loyal and competent 
individual to the nomenklatura position of chairman of the local council. 
Subsequently, the PUWP controlled local council will unanimously elect 
the committee's uncontested nominee. There have been reported instances 
of the Party's nominees receiving less than unanimous support and some 
cases of councils rejecting the nominee, forcing the Party to propose 
a new nominee.
Gierek's 19/2-1975 reforms further made local council presidium 
elections a mere formality. Upon attaining power, PUWP First Secretary 
Edward Gierek claimed that People's Poland would have more effective 
leadership if the principle "the party directs and the government governs" 
was e n a c t e d . cierek reasoned that the separation of functions called 
for in this principle would be realistj only when the Party controlled 
all policy formulating bodies. Consequently, he announced that each 
local PUWP secretary must be elected chairman of his local council. 
Subsequently, the councils dully elected their local Party secretaries 
chairmen of their presidiums.^ Clearly, the councils do not elect 
their own leadership. They rubberstamp presidium appointments made
outside the councils.
The higher authorities also use democratic centralism to plan or review 
the local presidium’s or council’s work and activities. Central interference 
in council affairs has contributed to councilor resignations and absenteeism.
Occasionally a council’s presidium may have its work completed before 
it is elected, effeetively making the presidium a symbol of local leadership 
devoid of any power. One of the functions of the presidium is to plan the 
sessions of the local council. Jacek Tarkowski found that in 1973 the 
Zwiers Commune Council approved a plan for the Council’s activities before 
it elected its presidium. ° Again, Tarkowski found that the local PUWP 
secretary, manager, and secretary of the commune administration in consul­
tation with higher authorities developed the plan for the Council’s sessions. 
Given that the 1972-75 reforms place effective power in the hands of the 
local administrator and party secretary, it may well be a common occurance 
that plans for local council activities are formulated by the local aktiv 
and not the council presidium.
’’Any council’s regulations, bylaws, or resolutions can be annuled, 
revised, or suspended by higher authorities."^ The commune council's 
enactments are subject to defacto and dejure approval of the province 
council, Council of State, and ultimately the Sejm. The province 
councils' enactments are reviewed by the supreme organs of state authority. 
Moreover, each presidium is required to submit to the next higher presidium 
or organ the minutes of the presidium’s and council's meetings and reports 
on their activities. Each tier supervises the other to check whether 
each council is contributing to the building of socialism in Poland.
Central Interference in the activities of the local councils is re
fleeted in the councilors' behavior. During the 1960s, some councilors 
resigned before finishing their terms because central Interference pro­
hibited them from doing their work. Ray Taras found that one in seven 
councilors elected in 1961 resigned within years because of bad 
relations in the councils, a feeling of helplessness in relation to the 
administration, lack of help from party authorities, and inefficient 
style of work.20
Dependence on the central authorities and their interference in 
local affairs contributes to councilor absenteeism. Oftentimes organ­
ization members begin to neglect their work when they feel that they are 
not being listened to or that their work is not contributing to the 
organization. Taras attributes the increased absenteeism on the Warsaw 
Praga-South Council to such feelings. He found that 25 percent of the 
councilors missed between one and three council meetings in 1961 (five were 
held). By 1962 this figure increased to 45 percent. 1^
Similarly, Tarkowski found that feelings of helplessness in relation 
to the central authorities and lack of resoucres contributed to high 
absenteeism on the committees of the Zwierz People's Council in 1973.
The chairmen of the Education Committee said "there is little incentive to 
debate and formulate plans when there is a shortage of resources. The 
list of needs is dutifully formulated and submitted to the higher authorities 
with little hope that they will be recognized."^ 2 Such attitudes 
may partially explain why attendance at Education Committee meetings 
fluctuated between 38 and 60 percent.
Democratic centralism limits the power of the loci] council to formulate 
its own plans and budgets, select its own leadership, and schedule its 
activities. Central interference undermines the council’s power and 
makes them helpless before the central authorities. Such helplessness 
contributes to councilor absenteeism which further undermines the power of 
the councils.
PARALLELING BUREAUCRACIES
The paralleling bureaucracies of the PUWP and state administration 
further undermine the local councils' decision-making powers. The local 
Party and state bureaucrac U»s are in a better position to initiate, implement, 
and enforce policies than the local council for a number of reasons. The 
local council's membership, expertise and real power, informal decision­
making processes, and agitation resources compare unfavorably vis a vis the 
Party and state bureaucracy. These weaknesses contribute to the local 
aktiv asserting real power at the local level in Poland.
The local PUWP central committee is in a much better position to 
initiate and implement policies than the local council because its membership 
is composed of the local aktiv and it can mobilize the Party rank and file 
to agitate in favor of Its policy proposals. For example, Tarkowski listed 
the membership of the Zwierz PUWP Central Committee. Its members Include 
leaders from the key social, economic, and administrative organs of the 
commune-— -director of the local school system, vice-president and director 
of an agricultural cooperative, the local manager, director of the local 
trade union, and others.23 As leaders of the important sectors of the Commune,
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these Individuals bring expertise to the central committee’s discussions. 
These individuals also have the power to Implement directly many of the 
decisions made at their meetings.
The Zwierz Council’s membership compares unfavorably to that of the 
Central Committee. The council’s membership has less expertise to deal 
with local problems. Of the council’s 26 members, 16 are farmers and workers, 
and the local aktiv accounts for 5 of the remaining 10 white collar workers 
on the council.24 Moreover, the local council must enact a policy and, 
await uppe» level approval before turning to the administration for im­
plementation whereas the central committee’s membership has the power to 
implement manv policies directly. The local council has less expertise 
and is less efficient than the PDWP committee in formulating and Implementing 
policy.
The local aktiv is composed of nomenklatura officials who have developed 
Informal decision making processes to solve problems quickly whereas the 
local council members have not. Tarkowski observed that the central committee 
members were personal friends and that thevoften discussed business over the 
telephone and during informal situations. During these informal situations 
the local aktiv divided tasks, considered alternative approaches to problems, 
or evaluated policy implementation. This development of an informal 
deci8ion-making process among the nomenklatura members is consistent with 
Bohdan Harasymjw's analysis of the Soviet mmmenklatura system. He found 
that the nomenklatura system fosters group cohesion and in extreme cases 
nepotism as members unite to protect their privleged positions from local 
and central challenges.^
43
Tarkovski did not observe similar cohesion among the councilors* 
Piekalkiewicz remarked that the councilors have so much to say to one 
another that they talk right through the council sessions because they 
have not been in contact for a long time. Disregarding informal meetings, 
the Party’s committee also has more formal oppoitunities to formulate and 
discuss policies since it meets every two or three weeks. The local 
councilors only meet seve.i time* annually.
In addition to being in a position to implement its own decisions, 
the Central Committee can call upon the party rank and file to agitate 
for its policies, For example, when the /^ wicrz Central Committee dec­
ided to raise monev to renovate the local school building because central 
allocations were inadequate, it first turned to the party rank and file to 
go out and build support for this project in the community. Subsequently, 
when the local party secretary introduced a resolution at a council 
session calling on the people of the commune to contribute .to
the school project, Its passage*had already been insured. The local 
councilors do not have an organization to agitate for their policies.
The local administrator is also in a better position to formulate 
and enforce policies than the local council. The local administrator 
is assisted in gathering information and formulating policy by the local 
administrative apparatus. His defacto power as a nomenklatura official 
is supplemented by dejure powers, such as residual administrative 
powers at the local level granted him by the 1972-75 reforms.26 Given 
that the manager has the power to act and that the council meets in­
frequently, he is likely to deal with problems as they arise. Oftentimes
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problems or Issues cannot wait to be discussed at the next session 
of the local council, so the manager will act in the councils place.
The ability to act quickly relative to the local council has raised 
the prestige of the manager in the commune.27
In addition to democratic centralism and the paralleling Party 
and state bureaucracy, certain administrative laws and procedures 
prevent the local councils from becoming effective representational bodies 
which demonstrate local initiative in formulating policies. These 
laws and procedures strengthen the PUWP's control of tht* local councils 
and Insure their obedience to th Party’s directives, guidelines, and 
policies. These administrative laws and procedures include the consensus 
election system; the remuneration laws for councilors, the recall 
process, and the number of local council sessions.
CONSENSUS ELECTIONS
To Insure that the local councils follow the principle of democratic 
centralism and the Party line as expressed through the supreme organs 
of state authority, the PUWP carefully controls who is elected to the 
local councils. Election laws, consensus elections, and polling place 
procedures insure that the Party's loyal members constitute a majority 
of all councilors. Although Its control of the elections reduces them 
to public rubberstamping, the Party has three motives for employing con­
sensus elections. Planned or unplanned, the composition of the local 
councils after the consensus elections also contributes to PUWP control
over the councils.
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Since 1973, the PUWP has been recognized In the election statutes 
as "the guiding force in Polish society." The UPP and the DP recognize the 
leadership of the PUWP and do not compete with the Party for power during 
elections to the local councils. In fact, all the political parties 
are required by law to present a single slate of candidates for each of 
the local multimandatc districts in Poland. ^8 Consequently, it is the 
nomination process which determines the composition of the local councils 
and not the actual voting since the voters choose from a single slate 
of safe candidates. The PUWP's control of the nomination process insures 
that only candidates whc will follow the Party line are slated and sub­
sequently rubberstamped by the public to serve in the local councils.
In a process similar to that already described for nominating 
delegates to the Sejm, local political, economic, and social leaders 
cooperate with the FJN and prepare a slate which is acceptable to the 
PUWP. The FJN subsequently submits this slate to the local State 
Electoral Commission. Until the mid-^SO’s the number of candidates 
on each slate equaled the number of mandates for each district. Since 
the voters had no choice among candidates, many of them obtained a ballot, 
walked over to the ballot box and dropped it in and thereby confirmed 
the Party's choice of candidates for their district. Only unintimidated 
voters would scratch off the names of candidates they opposed from the 
ballot before dropping it into the ballot box.
With the limited liberalization following the Polish October, con­
sensus elections replaced the earlier safe elections. The voter is still 
presented with a single slate of names, however the number of candidates
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exceeds the number of mandates by no more than one-half.^ For 
example, an electoral district which has six mandates would have 
no more than nine candidates for those mandates. The Polish voter
30has some choice as to which Communist Sponsored candidate fie selects.
Yet, the structure of the ballot and procedures at the polling 
place are designed to Influence even which communist the voter 
chooses. The slate of candidates printed on the ballot is divided into two 
sections. The number of candidates listed in the upper section of the 
ballot equals the number of mandates in the district. These candidates 
are whole-heartedly endorsed by the FJN. The lower section lists the 
extra candidates. These candidates are the FJN's second choice and 
are not likely to be elected.-**
To vote for one candidate in the lower section of the ballot, 
the voter must enter a voting booth and scratch an upper candidate's 
name off the ballot and the remaining lower names so that the total 
of unscratched names equals the number of mandates in the district.
A voter who enters a voting booth is publicly stating that he disagrees 
with the Party's choice of candidates for his district and may be 
attracting undue attention to himself. This process encouragos most 
voters to vote without scratching off names. Taras states that 80% 
of the electorate votes without scratching names off the ballot. ^
Given this voting behavior, the upper candidates are certain to 
receive the simple majority needed to win an election.
Although most people would agree that the election process in 
Poland is an elaborate rubberstamping process, the PUWP nonetheless
strives to insure high voter turnout to strengthen the electoral 
process as a symbol of socialist democracy. By western standards 
electoral turnout in Poland is very high. During the national Sejm 
elections held in March 1980, 98.8% of the eligible electorate cast 
ballots of whom 99,52% voted for the FJN's candidates.^ Local 
election day turnout is lower but support for FJN candidates equally 
high.
The PUWP has three motives for working for higher voter turnout. 
Fiist formal voting gives some people the feeling that they are parti­
cipating in the governance of their country and this strengthens the 
legitimacy of the PUWP in their eyes. Second, large election day 
turnouts are a public statement of at least tolerance of the status 
quo. Third, election day festivities and results provide excellent 
propaganda material.
Large voter participation in election day festivities and 
published statistics Indicating virtual unanimous support for the 
FJN's candidates may psychologically undermine some* opponents of the 
regime. Election day events and prop ganda make the regime's 
opponents wonder whether people are really opposed to the status quo. 
Teodor Palimka, Head of the PUWP C.C. Department of Administration, 
tried to psychologically undermine opponents of the regime during 
a speech given on April 20, 1978. He said: "During the last few
months the prestige of the anti-communists forces has suffered 
defeats....among them the high attendance and the number of votes 
received by the candidates of the FJN during the elections to the 
councils."34
Therefore, the PUWP makes a concerted effort to get out the 
vote. Before an election, the party press reminds the citizenry 
of their responsibility to be civic minded and to exercise their 
democratic rights. Party rank and file are assigned areas within 
which they must get out the vote and distribute absentee ballots.
Party members take this responsibility seriously since they are held 
responsible for voter turnout in their area. All party members are 
required to set an example by unfailingly exercising their right to 
vote.
Finally, every voter knows that his name is checked against a 
poll list before he casts his ballot. Consequently, the local author­
ities know who voted and who did not. Realizing that he is dependent 
on the authorities for many services, the voter will usually decide 
to vote so as not to attract undue attention to himself or suffer delays 
and reprisals when he needs services from the authorities. Also, not 
voting as a sign of protest is a futile act.
Voters may have good reasons for deciding to vote as well. The 
voter may be convinced that a pru^ u^ od candidate is undesirable for 
his district and that scratching his name off the ballot will at least 
signal to the Party that the candidate is less than satisfactory or 
contribute to another candidate being elected in his place. The 
voter may have accpeted the Party's propoganda as true and votes to 
fulfill his duties. Still others may vote out of habit.
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COMPOSITION
As expected, the consensus elections Insure that PUWP 
members consitute a near majority of all local councilors.
Other trends are also quantifiable from the composition of 
the councils over time. The elected councilors are increas­
ingly white collar workers in the 50 and older age group 
who have served on the local councils In the past. Planned 
or unplanned, these trends contribute to the PUWP*s control 
over the local councils. Each of these trends and their effect 
on the local councils Is discussed below.
The consensus elections insure that PUWP members con­
stitute a near majority of councilors at the provincial and 
communal level. Of the 6740 provincial councilors elected 
in 1976, 48.5 percent (3268) were . UWP members. The UPP, DP, 
and non-party councilors constituted 6.8 percent (458), 6.6 
percent (444), and 28 percent (1887) respectively of all pro­
vincial councilors.^6 At the commune level, the non-party 
councilors constituted a slightly higher percentage (31.3 ) 
of all commune councilors (100,876). Clearly, the Party is 
assured of near majority or a significant voting bloc in each 
counci 1.
A near majority or significant voting bloc in each council 
helps the PUWP control the local councils. PUWP members are 
subject to strict party discipline and will vote as a single 
voice in the councils. Policies which deviate from the Party 
line are not likely to be approved. Party discipline is at­
tained through the principle of democratic centralism. Party 
members are socialized to accept this principle and the Party
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line while participating in party activities. Members who 
fail to follow Party directives will be criticized at party 
meetingSjwhere their personal behavior is subject to scrutiny 
and criticism as well.
Fear of deviating from the Party line and being subject to 
criticism may discourage some councilmen from initiating policies. 
Some PUWP councilors will wait for higher authorities to propose 
policies to avoid criticism. Other councilors will simply wait 
for the Party line to change before introducing policy pro­
posals. The Party leadership’s insistence that members follow 
its political line may hinder policy initiative at the local 
level.
The educational and occupational levels of the local 
councilors have been rising. Between 1949 and 1969, the per­
centage of councilors with higher education rose from 16.7 
percent to 30.9 percent.^ Belatedly, the percentage of 
farmers on the councils fell from 53.2 percent in 1958 to 43 
percent in 1969. Although the education and occupation 
levels of public servants are rising throughout the world, 
this trend is significant for the PUWP’s control of the local 
councils. In Poland, the number of qualified individuals is 
greater than the number of white collar jobs, consequently 
competition for *hese jobs is intense. Thus the Party can 
use party loyalty as a criterion in filling white collar 
occupations. Therefore, educated, white collar councilors 
may have already proved their passive acceptance of or 
loyalty to the party*
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Moreover, virtually all white collar occupation* are 
in the state sector and their occupants on the government 
payroll. Occupants of these positions are economically 
dependant on the state (Party) and are not likely to be 
openly hostile to Its policies so as not to jepordize their 
positions. The decrease in the number of farmers on the 
councils strengthens the Party's control over the councils 
since the Party had less economic influence over the self- 
employed farmers than over the state employees.
The Party's economic leverage over state employees, and 
thus many councilors^ failed when many simultaneously joined 
Solidarity to press the Party for reforms which they could 
not obtain through the official trade unions. The Party 
did not want to dismiss thousands of workers and grind the 
state administration to a halt. Nevertheless, when the 
Party regained control of the political environment, and was 
able to apply individual pressure, state employees were more 
easily forced to sign loyalty oaths denouncing Solidarity than 
self-employed individuals.
The Increasing number of older, incumbent councilors
on the local councils also contributes to the PUWP's control
of the councils. The percentage of councilors in the 50 and
older age group has increased between 1961 and 1969 from 25.4
3 9percent to 28.3 percent. Men at the age of 50 are estab­
lished in their careers. They are not likely to jepordize 
their positions and family security by opposing the policies 
of the central authorities. Similarly, young councilors
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with families (30-50 age group) are likely to respond pos­
itively to central pressures. Both of these groups are more 
likely to follow central directives than young councilors who 
have not established themselves in a career or formed a 
family and thus have less to jepordize.
Piekalkiewic* argues that the PUl/1 deliberately selects 
older councilors over younger councilors during the slating
process because the latter are more independent and more 
likely to support revolutionary policies.^0 Simon would 
disagree that the dearth of young people on the councils 
is a result of a deliberate PUWP policy. Simon’s inter­
pretations of Polish university student attitudinal surveys 
stress that Polish students passively accept communist rule 
and that they are more concerned with material benefits than 
politics.Polish students are not interested in getting 
involved in local representative bodies.
The percentage of Incumbent councilors increased from 
42.6 percent to 50.4 percent between the elections of 1961 
and 1969.^2 Counciimen reelected for the third time and 
over consituted 34.5 percent of all councilors in 1969. 
Councilors who have served more than one term know the 
limits of permissible discretion during council functions 
and are not likely to overstep them. The incumbent coun­
cilors may warn younger councilors when they are going be­
yond the norm of accepted disagreement with central policies 
and may modify the younger councilors1 behavior. Similarly 
the central authorities have a better idea of how much
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resistance they are likely to encounter when dealing with 
experienced councilors. These mutal expectations of be­
havior set the boundaries of political participation in 
the councils.
REMUNERATION
The current legal statutes regulating the remuneration 
of councilors for their time and services discriminate in 
favor of state employees, thereby facilitating PUWP control 
over these councilors. Councilors are not paid a direct 
salary for their work. Instead, state employee councilors 
are entitled to leaves with pay from their regular place of 
employment while serving on a council.^ The councilor’s
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absence from his place of employment does not affect his seniority 
rights or holiday pay* In contrast, there is no sj 'em for reimbursing 
self-employed councilors for their time and loss of income while serving 
on a council. Unless a self-employed person is willing to undertake 
material sacrifices to serve on a council, he is not likely to get 
involved in local communist government.
Through its control of the state, the Party can exert economic 
pressures on state employed councilors. ^  Political police threats 
of releasing him from his government job may successfully pressure 
a councilor into following the Party line and supporting its policies 
during council sessions. The political police does not have this 
leverage over self-employed individuals. The discriminatory 
remuneration process also has other effects on the local councils*
Lack of economic incentives for self-employed professionals contributes 
to their underepresentation and the lack of expertise in local councils. 
Lack of economic incentives for self-employed councilors who do 
serve on the councils, such as farmers, may contribute to neglect of 
duties and absenteeism.
RECALL PROCESS
The internal recall process is a direct method of removing councilors 
who are irresponsible or unsympathetic toward PUWP policies and guidelines. 
A councilor who has 1) neglected his duties for six months; 2) been 
convicted of a crime of "dishonorable motive"; 3) violated the oath of 
councilors; or 4) damaged the reputation of the council through his 
actions can have his mandate revoked if 2/3 of his fellow councilors 
vote to do so. The first two proscriptions intend to insure that the
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councilors fulfill their obligations and do not violate the 
laws they helped formulate and approve. Such proscriptions 
are universally employed ~nd objective.
The third and fourth proscriptions are political control 
devices however. The councilor’s oath is essentially a promise 
to work toward the unity and progress of socialism. This oath 
and "actions defaming the local council" invite broad inter­
pretation and abuse. The purpose of the last two proscriptions 
is to enable the central and local leadership to remove coun­
cilors efficiently who have been unsympathetic to the Party’s 
policies or brought it embarrassment. Through its near 
majorities or sizable voting blocs in each council, the PUWP 
can raise the required 2/3 majority required to revoke a 
councilor’s mandate. For example, "activity against the 
programs of the FJN is interpreted as a violation of the 
councilor’s oath since the FJN’s goals are equa1 to the PUWP’s 
goals. During the 1961-1965 term, 3886 councilmen (2.1 per­
cent of all councilmen) were deprived of their mandate by
„ 4 5the councils for violating their oath.
The internal recall* process is an effective device for 
PUWP internal control of councilors. In contrast, the ex­
ternal recall process whereby constitutents can revoke a 
poor councilor’s mandate is long and cumbersome. The PUWP’s 
control of the external recall process enables it to thwart 
a constituency’s attempt to remove a councilor should it 
feel that the councilor should stay in office.
 ^„ A
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An electorate which is dissatisfied with a councilor's 
performance and wants to remove him must petition the local 
branch of the FJN to hold a meeting to consider their com­
plaints. The FJN conducts this meeting, listens to the 
citizens' complaints, and gathers evidence substantiating 
the charges against the councilor. Judging from the attend­
ance at the meeting and evidence submitted, the FJN votes 
whether to accept the constituents’ petition for revocation 
of mandate. If a majority of its members approve the pet­
ition, the FJN will submit the petition to the local People's 
Council Mandate Committee.
The Mandate Committee reviews the petition and evidence 
and asks the councilor to respond to the charges. Subsequently, 
the mandate committee reports to the full council. Upon hearing 
the report and if one-half of all councilors are present, the 
council will vote to accept a petition for rejection of man­
date. If the petition is rejected, the electorate can appeal 
to the next higher council or Council of State. If the pet­
ition is accepted and the next higher council approves, a ref­
erendum day is scheduled and the councilor's constituents asked 
whether they support the revocation of his mandate. A majority 
of the votes cast must call for revocation before the c >uncilor 
is dismissed•
The external recall process is cumbersome and can be thwarted 
the PUWP should it disagree with the constituency. That this 
process is cumbersome is illustrate! by the infrequeruy of its
#
use. "The lack of even one example between 1961-63 of the 
recall of a counciIman by his electors seems to indicate 
that the present regulations in the matter are 1ifeless.  ^
"Between 1969-73, 916 councilors were suspended. The reason 
in 742 cases was derelection of council duty.^® Should the 
PUWP disagree with the electorate, it can easily block the 
removal of a loyal councilor. The PUWP controls a majority 
of the FJN which can stop the external recall process at 
its birth. The PUWP controls nearly 50 percent of every 
local council and can invoke party unity to prevent the 3/4 
majority vote needed to accept a petition for revocation 
of mandate. Should the local council choose to oust a 
loyal member, the required majority approval at the next 
higher level to reverse the lower council*s decision is 
insured. To summarize, the PUWP controls the external recall 
process and can Insure that loyal members are not removed by 
the electorate. Conversely, the Internal recall process is 
sufficiently streamlined to enable the PUWP to efficiently 
remove unsympathetic councilors.
OTHER BARRIERS
Other barriers which prevent the local councils from be­
coming effective representative bodies include the Infrequency 
of their sessions, their rigidly scheduled sessions, and their 
lack of an independent Information base. On average, each 
council meets seven times annually. Of these seven days how­
ever, the councils only spend 3-4 days discussing issues which
affect their area other than the economic plan and budget. 
Two sessions each year are purely ceremonial: the first
session and the session held on July ?2nd. Piekalklewicz 
found that the first session of the local council has a 
festive atmosphere.^ Local Party and state officials 
give long speeches on the importance of the council's 
work and there is much eating and conversing. Aside 
from electing the presidium, little business is conducted. 
Similarly, the session held on July 22nd to comemorate the 
birth of People's Poland is festive. Party and state 
officials give speeches about the
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accomplishments of socialist Poland. No formal business is 
conducted.
Two sessions are spent considering the local economic 
plan and budget. As discussed earlier, these documents are 
largely prepared outside the council. Consequently the 
council’s consideration is after the fact and the discussion 
centers on details as opposed to the priorities of the plan 
and its goals.
After the ceremonial and economic sessions, the councils 
on average have 3-4 days to consider local problems. 
Piekalkiewicz found thaty unless the presidium does a good job 
balancing the counil’s issue schedule, many issues will be 
neglected by the council. Although the better planned council 
sessions alloted one or two days for discussion of the 
communal economy, local industry, housing, and education^that 
hardly seems like enough attention to deal with these serious 
problems In Poland.-*® The councils consideration of these 
issues was primarily through discussion of proposals and 
resolutions submitted by the administration. The consider­
ations were after the fact and dealt with specific questions. 
The large number of proposed resolutions oftentimes forced 
the councils to consider them superficially given their 
full s c h e d u l e s . T h e  councils need more time to consider 
local problems thoroughly.
As suggested above, the council’s open sessions are
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carefully planned which reduces their spontaneity. If not 
prepared for it beforehand, the council's presidium In 
cooperation with the Council of Seniors develops the council’s 
program. In addition to presidium members, the council of 
Seniors is composed of the chairmen of the standing committees 
and the party club leaders. The presidium and Council of 
Seniors decide what issues affecting their area should be 
considered by the council. After determining the agenda, 
the presidium and Council of Seniors organise support for 
central policies on the agenda and structure the debate 
on the issues to be considered. Thereafter, the party 
club leaders take their assigned tasks back to their 
members and distribute the tasks among themi
Tarkowski found that the party clubs in 7,wierz . meet 
one half hour before the full session. Councilors are en- 
formed of the issues on the agenda at this time and are 
presented with documentation on the issues. Pieka1klew!cz 
found that councilors are assigned debate roles and often­
times told how they should vote during the party club 
5 1sessions. J
Piekalkiewicz states that the result of these advance 
preparations are sessions which seem like rehearsed plays.^ 
Everyone plays his part and there are no surprises. Advance 
planning reduces the possibility of sensitive or embaras ing 
topics being raised during council sessions. Only in
6 !
exceptional cases will issues not on the agenda be discussed.
Session planning limits the council's power to deal with pro­
blems as they arise or engage in spontaneous discussion, evaluation, 
or criticism of policies.
Finally the council's dependence on the administration for 
their information limits their initiative and hinders their 
supervisory roles. As discussed earlier, councilors are often 
presented with issue information immediately before sessions so 
that they have insufficient time to study the information and 
formulate policy proposals. Lack of support staff also hinders 
the councilors ability to formulate policy. The uniformed 
councilors play a minor role during full sessions aud committee 
meetings because the meetings are dominated by those who re­
searched and formulated the policies. The local administration 
dominates the policy debate and formulation process.
The administrative apparatus can withhold or oversupply 
the councilors with Information to attain its goals. More­
over, the councilors rely on reports on the administration's 
activities prepared by the administration to supervise the 
local administration. The potential for administrative 
curtailment of the council's supervisory powers is clear.
An independent information base would strengthen the council's 
policy formulation and supervisory powers.
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This chapter has shown that the local councils, 1 the the 
Sejm, do not formulate policies at the local level. Policy 
formulation at the local level is largely performed by the 
iocal administrator and Party secretary. Since the admin­
istrator is also responsible for executing policies, he has 
significant powers at the local level.
The ineffectiveness of the local council, and the 
significant powers of the local administrator granted him 
by the Gierek reforms, result in the local administrator 
being largely responsible for local government. Clear re­
sponsibility for local government greatly enhances Party 
control over local government. This is the subject of
the nex t chapter .
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXECUTIVE
After the Sejm and the People’s Councils approves its 
policies! the Party Implements them through the State admini­
stration. The Party uses the State aministrat ion to implement 
its policies because, domestically and abroad, the State is the 
symbol of ultimate power in Poland. Use of the State admini­
stration to implement its policies also shields the Party from 
criticism when problems or shortcomings arise. Increasingly, 
however, the citizens of Poland realize that the State admini­
stration i8 the executive arm of the Party and they criticize 
the Party directly for continuing economic and political problems.
Most Importantly, the State administration permeates Polish 
society, and control of the State administration enables the 
Party to maintain power. The PRP's State administration is very 
large because the Polish economy is centrally administered.
Thus, in addition to providing public services such as social 
security and public transportation, the State administers 
virtually all raw material suppliers, manufacturing enterprises, 
and distribution centers. Only the agricultural sector and 
some private enterprises are not centrally administered. Con­
sequently, the State bureaucracy permeates Polish society and 
organizes it in a hierarchical fashion. Control of the key 
positions in this bureaucracy enables the Party to control 
society and to maintain itself in power.
The Party employs the nomenklatura system to control the 
State administration and to make it work for the Party's ends. 
Through the nomenklatura system, the Party appoints loyal members
- 6 6 -
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to all key post3 within the State administration. To Insure 
that the nomenklatura officials wield their power to Implement 
its policies, the PUWP checks their power through control 
devices. These control devices Include statutory delimitation 
of powers, democratic centralism, Party and representative body 
supervision, and economic incentives. Ultimately, the Party 
can employ the military and security police to force the implement 
ation of certain policies and to maintain itself in power.
This chapter is divided into three sections: the central
administration, local administration and coercive organs.
Each section will describe the organization, function, and 
powers of the relevant organ and analyze how the Party controls 
it and uses it to stay in power.
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
The Council of Ministers is constitutionally recognized 
as the supreme organ of State administration. It is composed 
of ministers, such as the Minister of Heavy Industry, and 
secretaries and directors of ministerial rank, such as the 
Director of the State Price Commission. The Council’s primary 
tasks include: 1) adopting and submitting to the Sejm the annual 
state budget, annual economic plan, and long term economic 
plan; 2) coordinating the work of the individual ministries 
and the local administrative organs; 3) supervising public law 
and order; and A) controlling foreign and defense policies.
6 8
In 1980, the Council of Ministers was composed of 41 members*
MIn functional terms, the Council of Ministers is much too
large to operate continuously as a single deliberative organ."*
Consequently, the Council of Ministers divides itself into
standing and ad hoc committees, interdepartmental committees,
and subcommittees to deal with the numerous issues effecting
the PRP. The work and activities of these various committees
is planned and coordinated by the Presidium of the Council of
Ministers which is chaired by the Prime Minister. The Prime
Minister and Deputy Premiers exercise special mediating and
2leadership roles in the various committees.
Unlike the Sejm, the Council of Ministers has real power.
The power'df the Council of Ministers stems from its membership, 
decree powers, and resources. As will be shown below, most of 
the ministers are nomenklatura officials who hold upper level 
positions within the Party. They have demonstrated their 
leadership and political abilities early in their careers as 
primary party organization activists. The ministers have 
completed higher education in technical fields. Some have 
been trained in the Soviet Union. If he is also a high ranking 
Party official, the minister has a local power base which he 
cautiously wields in the corporate-decision making process of 
the Council of Ministers and Party organs.^ As members of 
the power elite, the ministers have the power to make decisions. 
Except for their leadership, the fejm deputies are not nomenklatura
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officials.4
The decrees of the Council of Ministers have the force of 
law and become law with post facto approval of the Sejm. Through 
its decree powers the Council of Ministers can respond quickly 
to adminiatrative bottlenecks! economic plan imbalances, or 
security dangers. Since 1970* the Council of Ministers has 
decreed a myriad of administrative rules and regulations. The 
required approval of the Sejm is a mere formality. The Council 
of Minister’s decrees are binding on the cltiaenry Just as if 
they had been issued by the Sejm.
Another source of power for the Council of Ministers is its 
access to information* In addition to the information he receives 
from hia local power haaoi a minister has access to Party and 
State information channels. t o t  example* the PUWP Secretariat 
collects information on public response to policy proposals 
which it transmits to the ministers. Each minister also has access 
to government information centers such as the Main Statistical 
Office, State Price Commission, and industrial associations.
Each minister receives the White PAP. Finally, each minister 
has his own research staff to help him investigate problems 
and formulate solutions. The Sejm primarily relies on the 
administration for its information.
An indirect measure of the State administration's access 
to information relative to that of the Sejm and its committees 
is the number of desiderata addressed to the government by
the Sejm. The Sejm or its committees address desiderata to the 
administration or an individual agency whenever they need more 
information to consider a governmt it proposal. The government 
must respond within 30 days. The number of desiderata addressed 
to the government rose from 288 in 1971 to 442 in 1 97 2 . The 
increase in the number of desiderata is usually interpreted 
to mean that the Sejm and its committees are irore carefully 
reviewing government proposals. The author submits that the 
increase in the number of desiderata mav also reflect that 
the Sejm and its committees are increasingly relying on govern­
ment information to consider proposals because they cannot 
obtain Such information from their own resources.
Another indirect measure of the administration's power 
relative to that of the Sejm is the extent of the Sejm's changes 
in government proposed bills. In one day in March 1972, sixteen 
government bills were introduced and passed without amendment 
"Of these, seven dealt with the establishment of new top-level 
administrative agencies and, in a blanket grant of authority, 
delegated to the Council of Ministers the power to define their 
jurisdictions."^ Moreover, the number of government proposed 
bills that were fully accepted or lust edited by the Sejm has 
ranged from 1/3 during the 1961-65 session to nearly 3/4 in 1972. 
The number of government bills the Sejm substantially changed 
has fallen through time. During the 1952-56 session, the Sejm
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substantially changed 12.8 percent of the government's
bills. By 1972t this percentage had fallen to 2.2 percent.
The intermediate action of amending the government's bills 
has fluctuated widely, but usually has been the most common 
action taken by the Sejm. This data substantiates earlier 
contentions that the Sejm does not alter the fundamental premises 
of proposed legislation merely its technical details. Con­
versely, the government and thereby the Partv gets Its policies 
approved virtually intact. The myriad of administrative 
decrees, regulations, orders, and proposed bills also indicates 
the administration demonstrates more legislative initative 
than the Sejm.
The power of the Council of Ministers to control t he State 
administration and keep the Party in power is illustrated by 
the fact that the PUWP Politburo itself appoints the Council of 
Minlsteis. An operating principle of the nomenklatura system 
is that the more important a government, political, or economic 
position, the higher the Party organ responsible for filling 
it and monitoring the occupant's performance. The Council of 
Ministers is on the nomenklatura list of che PUWP Politburo.^
At the beginning of a new Sejm session, the existing Council 
of Ministers submits a formal resignation to the Sejm which it 
accepts. Thereupon, the PUWP Politburo, through the FJN, submits 
a single slate of nominees for a new Council of Ministers. The 
Sejm unanimously approve the Politburo's appointments.
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The Prime Minister is usually a Politburo member. Currently
Prime Minister General Jaruzelski is a Politburo member and the
PUWP First Secretary. The remaining ministers are usually
full or candidate Politburo members, Secretariat-members, Central
Committee members, or local First Secretaries. In 1968, out of
thirty-one ministers, 21 were high ranking members of the Pl'WP,
Only five ministerial posts were held by non-communists.** The
PUWP Politburo is enacting Lenin's thesis that top party and
1 2government organs should conglomerate or blend.
Despite their undisputed loyalty to the Party, there are
formal controls checking the power of the Council of Ministers
and individual ministers. An important check on the power of
the Council of Ministers, the individual Ministers and their
Vice-Ministers is that their duties and standard operating
procedures are carefully defined in statutory law. Moreover,
the ministers periodically report on their activities to the
PUWP Politburo or Secretariat. The First Secretary can check
a minister's reports against the information provided him by the
l 3political police and Party a p p a r a t u s .
Ministers or ministries suspected of corruption or mis­
management are investigated by the Sejm's Supreme Chamber of 
Control. The Sejm also checks the activities of the ministers 
by reviewing their decrees and policy proposals. The Procurator 
and judiciary prosecute and sentence ministers who violate the
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The lower nomenklatura officials such as the directors 
of ministerial departments, are bound by democratic centralism 
to obey the directives of their superiors and ultimately the 
PUWP First Secretary. They have been politically socialized 
to accept democratic centralism through their particiaption 
in Party activities. The nomenklatura officials are also 
encouraged to follow the Party line by economic incentives. 
They realize that access to well stocked stores and housing 
make life in a demand-pull economy much easier. Prospects 
of more material privileges and more power motivate some 
nomenklatura members to continue to be devoted yes-men.
The following list of executive positions on the nomen­
klatura of the central party organs further illustrates the 
Party^ pervasive control over the central administration.
This list also substantiates the claim that the Party and 
State administration are virtually one since so many key 
administrators are PUWP members and subject to the afore­
mentioned controls. This list was complied from PUWP Central 
Committee documents.
Politburo
1. President and vice-president of Council of Ministers
2. Ministers and their equivalents
3. Ambassadors and plenipotentiary envoys
4. Vice-ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and 
national defense.
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Secretariat
1. Vice-ministers and equivalents
2. Presidents of central administrative organs
3. President of the Bank of Poland
4. Presidents of state cooperatives i.e. Spolfem
5. Assistant secretary general and representatives 
to Comecon,
6. Directors of departments in the Ministry of interior
Secretaries
l. Assistant commander in chief of Police 
2* General directors of ministries and equivalents
3. Vice-presidents of central administrative organs
4. President of Chamber of External Trade
5. Vice-President of Bank of Poland
6. Directors of central banks
7. General directors of central banks
8. Directors of centers for internal and external trade
9. Directors of regional departments of Roads and 
Telecommunications
10, General director of Bureau of Customs
11. Provincial police commanders
Chiefs of Departments
1# Directors of departments of Council of Ministers
2. Assistant director of Office of Religion
3. Commander in chief of firemen
4. Directors of national public enterprises such 
a8 LOT, Orbls, and Wars
5. Vice-presidents and branch presidents of 
cooperatives.
Table 3.1: Nomenklatura Positions in the State
Administration
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
Local administration in Poland parallels the two-tier structure 
of the local representative bodies.^ The executive is responsibe 
for administrative matters at the provincial level while the 
manager administers the commune. Formally, the Prime Minister
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appoints the provincial executives with the advice of the 
provincial councils. The executives appoint communal managers 
with the advice of the local councils. Actually, the Prime 
Mininster consults with the Secretariat and the executive 
with the provincial PUWP Central Committee before filling 
these positions since they are on the nomenklatura of those 
respective party organs. Executives and managers are appointed 
for an unspecified term.
Gierok's 1972-1975 local administrative reforms have 
resulted in the local administrators wielding substantial 
economic, political, and patronage powers. The local admin­
istrators have all residual administrative powers within their 
jurisdiction.*^ They are not held accountable for some dec­
isions. The local administrator must approve plans to liquidate*
a local enterprise and can suspend local enterprise directors.
The administrator can transfer unused resources between enterprises 
within his Jurisdiction and thereby reduce supply problems. He 
can take necessary emergency measures, including use of the 
police and security forces, to protect State property and 
Interests* Finally, the local administrator appoints his own 
department heads and the directors and deputy directors of 
local industry.
The executives and managers are assisted in their tasks 
by the local administrative departments. The local administrative 
departments are nrmiches of the ministries. In the commune of
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Zwierz , for example, some of the departments Included: ad­
ministrative and organizational affairs, construction, agri­
cultural services, communal economy, and irrigation. These 
departments deal respectively with such issues as certifying 
documents, issuing building permits and allocating building 
supplies; and determining titles to farmlands.*^
AXIS OF POWER
Taras and Tarkovski found that the local administrator and
18local PUWP secretary dominate local politics in Poland. This 
situation stems from the real powers of the local administrator 
and the weakness of the local council. The local Party secretary 
supervises the local administrator to insure that he implements 
the Party’s policies. An axis of power develops between the 
local administrator and Party secretary.
Through a survey conducted in Zwierz, Tarkowski found that 
a significant number of local citizens believed that the Gierek 
reforms Improved local administration. Moreover, some of those 
surveyed believed that the local manager did have the power to 
solve their administrative problems. In fact, the Zwierz Commune 
manager did help his constituents by correcting tax assessments, 
issuing building permits, and insuring the delivery of supply 
allocations. The manager's ability to provide such services 
raised his prestige in the commune. His prestige was further 
enhanced by a media campaign which informed the public that the
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local manager could solve most of their administrative problems 
thereby eliminating the need to travel to the province capital to 
solve such problems. The manager's prestige was raised to the 
point that local citizens insisted that the manager deal with 
their matters when his department officers should have dealt 
with them.
These formal powers and prestigef when combined with his 
educatlont information resources! and availability, enable the local 
administrator to outperform the local council and dominate 
local politics. The local administrator is more educated and in­
formed than the local councilor. By 1975, there were no commune 
managers who had not completed secondary education and 40 percent had 
had further education.^ The percentage of councilors with 
higher education was closer to 30 percent.
The local administrator is also better Informed than the 
councilor. The full-time administrator uses his support staff 
and access to State and party bureaucracy information to help him 
study and formulate policies on local Issues. Conversely, 
the councilor holds a full-time job elsewhere in the economy.
He has no support staff and little time to study local problems.
T rkowski found that the Z w i e v z '  councilors did not become 
familiar with Issues until right before council sessions when the 
administrator presented them with information.
Since the administrator researched and formulated the policy 
proposals presented before the council, he dominates the discussion
during the council’s full session and committee meetings,
Tarkovski found that the administrator and his assistants 
reported on most Issues to the council and answered the councilor* 
questions. The administrator and chairman of the presidium 
did most of the talking at Zwler council meetings.^0 Since 
the local administrator has real power and Is better educated 
and lnformei than the local councilor, he dominates lopgl 
politics and administration.
The local administrator *g dominance of local politics 
establishes clear responsibility for local affairs and thereby 
facilitates Party control over the administrator and local 
affairs. The local administrator is aware that if his commune 
does not perform according to the expectations of the central 
authorities he will be removed. Since his job is on the line, the 
administrator is pressured to closely supervise his staff and 
Insure that they are implementing central directives and 
following the Party line. An administrator’s close supervision 
may farther concentrate decision-making powers in his hands 
as Insecure department heads channel their decisions to the 
administrator. In Zwierg Tarkovski found that the manager
and his assistants were a close knit group and informally
21divided responsibilities among themselves.
In addition to one-man resaonsib11ity for local affairs, 
other Party controls over the local administrator include the 
local party secretary and apparatus, statutory law, democratic
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centralism, bureaucratic entrenchment, and the local council*
As discussed in the preceedlng chapter, the local party 
secretary and committee have substantial power by virtue of their 
membership and resources. The party apparatus can concentrate 
its pressure on the administrator forcing him to consider its 
opinion or heed central directives. Party committee members, 
who double as key communal leaders, can subvert the admini­
strators policies by not supporting them or not using their 
full power to Implement them.
In fact, Taras and Tarkowski found that an axis of power 
develops between the local administrator and party secretary. ^  
lach countervalIs the power of the other. Tarkowski found that 
in Zwierg the secretary and administrator were friends and 
informally made decisions between themselves. This and other 
evident led Taras to conclude that the local admlnlatrator 
and party secretary, who doubles as council chairmen, ere 
probably the individuals who govern in provincial and communal 
areas in Poland.
Other than hiu residual powers, the administrator's powers 
and responsibilities are «ptcif$id in a myriad of administrative 
laws. His power is ||io chicked through democratic centralism.
The local admtniatrator gust obey administrative laws or face 
central reprimands, removal, or court sentencing. Central 
directives require the local administrator to respond to local 
problems in the manner prescribed by the central authorities.
Virtually all the commune manager's actions«.are subject to th 
control and review of the provincial executive; the Miniater 
of Admin is trait i o n , Local Economy, and Environmental Pra­
te* t ion; the frime Minister; ami ultimately the Council of 
Minister*, i t  argued earlier, under the logic of democratic 
ce ntralism virtual 1- all the mdiministre tor ' s ectioat can he 
c h e c k e d •
To a lesser extent, the local administrator *s power tan 
he checked hy his own local bureaucracy, leery bureaucracy 
develops standard operating procedures to deal with recurring 
problems. Consequently, the local civil servants may resist 
chenits in standard operating procedures advocated by the 
manager, especially when they violate central rules. A local 
bureaucracy la noat likely to resist the oveiaealous reforms 
of a newly assigned adninistretor trying to Impress his 
superiors ,
Finally, the local council may check the administrator's 
power. The council is responsible for supervising the work 
of the local administrator and report ing dereliction of duty 
or abuses of power to the next higher representative body. 
Moreover, certain issues may unite the councilors and lead 
them to pressure the administrator to respond to their 
demands. The administrator cannot ignore the council.
The Party controls the pervasive State administration 
by placing loyal members in key administrative positions. Th*
Party insures that these administrators follow its leader­
ship and thereby keep it in power through statutory definition 
of their duties, democratic centralism, Party and re pr es ent­
atives body supervision, and economic incentives. Thus, the 
Party makes the State administration its own executive arm.
Should the pervasive State administration fail, the Party 
can use force to maintain itself in power.
Modern industrialization policies require the active 
participation of members of society for successful implementation. 
Fear and terror stifle the creative thinking and experimentation 
needed to harness the forces of modern technology for societal 
development. After consolidating power,the PUWP reduced its use 
of coercion to facilitate the Implementation of industrial­
ization policies. Nevertheless, the Party maintains and controls 
the military and political police to meet external challenges 
to its power and to stifle internal political opposition.
MILITARY
Although modern technology, professionalism, and military 
values work to increase the autonomy of the armed forces, the 
Party has been able to maintain its supermacy over the military 
by adjusting its control mechanisms to meet the challenge of 
these forces. The Party controls the military because it realizes 
that political power comes out the barrel of a gun and it 
became a cardinal principle that the Party control the gun and
never vice v e r s e . 2 '* Through emending its control mechanisms, 
the Perty has insured thet its rule end the stetus quo will 
not he violently challenged by the military sector* Moreover, 
the PUMP has e modern military which will protect People's 
Poland from external aggression. However, the military is 
less reliable for external offensive campaigns and repressing 
Internal challenges to the Party's power. After a brief discussion 
of the forces leading to the increased autonomy of the military, 
the Party and Warsaw Pact control mechanisms over the Polish 
military are analysed.
The high technology of modern warfare requires that military 
officers be able to make quick d e c i s i o n s . 2* An officer informed 
of approaching enemy aircraft or cruise missiles- must respond 
to the challenge immediately or risk the danger of the enemy 
completing his mission and losing the battle or war. Neither 
the military officer nor People's Poland has the time to hesitate 
and pass the decision up to another commanding officer or to 
obtain Party clearance. Effective defense against modern weapons 
requires that competent military officials have real decision­
making powers.
The famous Polish sociologist, Jersy Wiatr, asserts that 
"every army is not only part of the general social system but 
also a separate and to some extent autonomous social system."2* 
Professionalism and military values roster the autonomy of the 
armed forces. The Polish senior officers are products of Soviet
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Military institutions.** They have studied m i l i t a r y  science 
and adopted the values of military life. The lower military offic 
trained in Polish officer academies, have adopted similar values. 
The military has its own protocol and reward system. Military 
training and values instill in military men a group c o n ­
sciousness which is resistant to the arbitariness of politics.
Indeed, the aloofness of the military from the rest of the 
Polish political system is Indirectly illustrated by the popular 
support of the election of Defense Minister General Jaruselski 
to the position of Prime Minister in 1980. General Jaruselski 
and others worked hard to raise the prestige of the Polish 
military after its Soviet commanders were removed following 
the Polish October. Increased professional standards for 
officers, improved benefits, and aloofness from Party politics 
raised the prestige of the military to the point that during the 
late seventies it was regarded as the only well functioning 
organization in Poland. Jaruselskl's outstanding performance 
and clean record led many Poles to believe that only he could 
lead Poland out of its current crisis. Modern technology, 
professionalism, and military values have made the military 
relatively autonomous within the Polish political system.
The chief Polish military sociologist, Gracsyck, states 
that the "Polish party achieves its leading role in the military 
through the constitutionally guaranteed subordination of the 
army to the state authorities; the work of the political apparatus 
in the army; and the actions of the commanders based on the 
exact execution of the tasks formulated by the Party."** More
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s p e c i f i c a l l y 9 the PUWP controls the military through: 1) ptwp' fce*~
ber - officers, 2) the Main Political Ad mi ni str at ion (MPA) 
and its political officers, 3) political courses in military 
academies, 4) ideological indoctrination, and 5) the Internal 
military security service.
Just as all key political and economic positions in society 
are occupied by PUMP members, virtually all Polish military officers 
belong to the PUMP. The political reliability of the Defense 
Minister is indicated by the fact that except from 1988 to 1971, 
he has been a Politburo member. Moreover, 100 percent of the 
senior officers are PUWP members, and 85 percent of all Polish 
officers are PUWP members.
An officer's membership in the PUWP implies at least his 
passive acceptance of the leading role of the party in the armed 
forces. The officer's membership enables the party to keep 
close watch on him. He is subject to Party discipline, in­
doctrination, and scrutiny. His participation in party 
activities will give party officials the opportunity to learn 
the officer's true opinions. When an officer leaves the Party 
his action is antiparty, and his loyalty is suspect.
Intlally, the Party recruited its red officers from the 
correct socio-political classes. During the PUWP's c o ns ol id­
ation of power in the late 1940's and early 1950's, socio-political 
criteria took precedence ovta' professional criteria in the re­
cruitment of officers. The PUWP did not want to recruit its
as
officer* fro® aaong th* officer* of the elitist prewar force* 
or fro® the bourgeois classes. Instead, the Party sought officer 
candidates aaong the working classes and to a leaser extent 
aaong the peasants. Although this policy was ideologically 
activated, it also increased party loyalty since the new officers 
were totally dependent on the Party for their laproved social 
and econoaic status. By 1963, aost coaaissloned officers caae 
fro® worker or peasant fsallies: 48.6 percent of the officers
were sons of workers and 33.3 percent were sons of peasants.
Only 11.3 percent of all Polish officers cane fro® white collar 
worker f a a i l i e s . 2 9  Today, party aeabershlp, rather than so c i o ­
political background, is a aore iaportant qualification for 
entering the officer corps.
POLITICAL OFFICERS
The PUWP C.C. Administration Departaent supervises aili ta ry 
personnel policy and the araed forces' role in the State adalni- 
stratlon. The Main Political Ad ninistration (HPA) supervises 
political and personnel aatters in the ailitary. The MPA has 
central coaalttee power status and is headed by the Deputy 
Defense Minister who is checked by the PUWP Politburo and 
Secretariat. The PUWP Adainistratlon Departaent and MPA conduct 
their work through the political officer.
The evolution of the role of the political officer clearly
illustrates the Party's flexibility in adopting its control
me ch anisms to developments in the military and the political 
environment. v During the transformation p e r l o d 9 the political 
officer's primary role mas to help the security force* detect 
hostile elements within the officer corps and among the regular 
troops, the political officer's knowledge of the political 
reliability of individuals made him influential in promotions 
and other personnel decisions. As political i n d o c t r l n a t o r , 
the political officer mas to lnaure that the officers and 
soldiers at least outwardly accepted communist rule, went 
through the motions of party activities, and believed that the 
communist system was no worse than the proceeding system, the 
atom is ati on of the soldiers resulting from the terror of the 
internal security forces increased the influence of the political 
officer on new recruits while performing his duty as personal 
c o u n s e l o r .
During the internalisation phase which coincided with the 
Stalinist era, the political officer's primary role shifted 
from Informant to propagandist. Loyal rank and file Party 
members were selected and enrolled in political officer schools. 
The cu rriculum of the political officer schools stressed political 
courses such as the history of the Party and Marxism-Leninism.
The political officer studies very little military science.
Upon graduation, the political officer was assigned to a 
battalion where he would try to indoctrinate the officers and 
troops by repeating simple political messages, presenting
lectures on poli ti cal topics, and engaging in private d i s ­
cussions on political topics with the soldiers.
With the slid thaw and introduction of M o de rn weapons 
systems into the Polish m i li ta ry following the Polish O c t o b e r t 
mi litary officers began to question the need for a political 
officer in a modern military. The m i li ta ry officers argued that 
the political officer had little in common with the officer corps 
since he had only a minimal understanding of mili ta ry science 
and no understan di ng of modern weapons systems. The officer 
corp began to feel that the political officer's lectures and 
political activities distracted them from their m i li ta ry studies. 
Others were angered when an unknowledgeable person interfered 
with their decisions. The Party responded to these challenges by 
raising the mili ta ry expertise of the political officers.
The Party initially responded to these challenges by recruiting 
political officers from among officers who had completed a three 
year commission. These recruits were enrolled in a short term 
political training course and then given a political officer 
commission. The Party also recruited university graduates and 
distinguished soldiers, enrolled them in military academies, 
allowed them to complete a three year commission as regular 
officers, and then trained them as political officers. This 
new system of training political officers soon proved to be 
un satisfactory however. The Party had to wait six years before 
training a political officer and his political training was 
superf i c i a l .
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Consequently In 1969, the Party adopted a new policy for 
training its political officers. The Party established 
political officer training sections at the 14 regular officer 
academies. It recruited individuals fro* civilian life who 
attended the academy for three years just as the regular 
officers. However, the political o f f l e e r fs currlculua was 
split between Military and p o l i t i c a l - n o d a l  science courses. 
Soon the nuaber of required social science courses increased 
as the Party decided to train its political officers as social 
scientists. The Party hoped that as a social scientist the 
political officer would understand the dynamics of modern 
mi litary life and provide the regular officers with useful 
analyses thereby raising his prestige in the military sector.
The coursework at the academies increasingly emphasised 
developing empirical research skills. The political officers 
were given the opportunity to hone their research skills at 
the Center for Sociological Research opened under the direction 
of the MPA, and the Institute of Social Science opened in 1971. 
At the Institute of Social Science, the political officers 
conducted research o n t 1) the attitudes of youth toward the 
military, 2) the attitudes of soldiers toward the party, and 
3) combat stress. The political officer became a technical 
specialist in the so^io-scientific problems of modern warfare.
Currently, the political officer le present down to the 
battalion level. The battlllon level political officer la 
responsible for about 500 wen and analytes their *#eio*pay- 
chological state, morale, and combat readiness. Political officers 
above the battalion level conduct research on the pereonal 
attitudes of career personnel, review lower level reports and 
propose progress of action, and inspect lower level units to 
insure that proper attention is given to political work.
Many of the political officers tasks stem fron his being the 
Party's ma in representative in the arsed forces. The political 
officer supervises the work of party secretaries which head 
prlsary party organisations down to the battalion level. The 
political officer's research into personnel attitudes enables 
his to Influence personnel decisions. His research also 
facilitates his work as personal counselor. Working with 
individuals as counselor also gives the political officer an 
opportunity to engage in political indoctrination and discover 
potential troublemakers which he reports to the internal military 
police. The political officer's status is codified in the internal 
army regulations which provide that respect for the chain of 
command is not binding on the political officer in ideological, 
party, political, cultural, and personal matters.^*
In addition to using party membership and the political
officer to control and Indoctrinate the military into accepting
the supremacy of the Party, the PUWP encourages military per-
32sonnel to enroll in political courses. The goal of the political
courses program la similar to that of the mass media. Through 
the political courses, the Party is trying to strengthen the Interest 
of soldiers in p o l i t i c s t teach them the Marxist-Lenlnlst 
Waltanchuung, and strengthen their experience in public life 
and the Communist movement. During the late 1940's, enlisted 
personnel attended political lectures for two hours meekly.
Officers mere encouraged to attend seminars, which required written 
examinations and papers, totaling about 8 hours per month.
Although attendance was voluntary, housing privileges and promotions 
were facilitated by active participation.
During the Stalinist era, participation in political courses 
and seminars was mandatory. Attendance and examinations were 
carefully checked. With the thaw in 1956, participation again 
became voluntary and the number of suggested seminar hours was 
reduced to 28 per year. Nevertheless, the officers argued 
that the seminars and their written assignments kept them from 
their military studies. Currently, political self-study is 
stressed. Although some deal with party history and Ideology, 
current seminars stress interesting and relevant topics such 
as the CMEA, Middle East Politics, and socialist management. 
Attendance has been estimated between fifty and sixty percent.
The Party also controls the military by disciplining or 
removing hostile elements. Officers or soldiers who jeopordlse 
the security interests of Poland or fall to contribute to the 
building of socialism are tried and sentenced by special military 
courts. The security and paramilitary organs also help the Party 
control the military. "Their role with regard to the military is 
to serve as the party's eyes and ears within the mi l i t a r y  and
91
act as an equaliser vis a vis the military's inherent Instit­
utional p o w e r . T h e  security forces search for hostile elements 
before they attain decision-making powers.
Finally, the Warsaw Fact decision-making process and its 
formal and Informal ties to the Polish military contribute to the 
maintenance of party supremacy over the military. Dale Her- 
sprlng states that Poland's military budget is formulated
by the Warsaw Pact Joint Chiefs of S t a f f . This organisation 
also decides which modern weapons systems will be Introduced 
into the Polish military. Thus the possibility of a PUWP- 
Polish military dispute over military budgets and technology 
is greatly reduced. Poland's military leaders must lobby for 
their interests through contacts with their colleagues in the 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact leadership.
A number of formal and Informal ties atune the Polish 
officers to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact military mentality 
which includes strengths ling the leading role of the Party.
Some of the formal ties Include the 1956 Status of Forces 
Agreement and Polish representation in the Joint Command of 
the Warsaw Pact, the Staff of the Joint Armed Froces, the 
Committee of Defense Ministers, and the Military C o u n c i l . ^
Less formally, the Polish military officers acquire the Soviet 
military mentality through their training at the Voroshilov 
Academy in the USSR, studying Soviet military literature, 
attending Joint conferences and seminars, participating in 
joint command staff exercises, and exchanging officers. Indeed,
ft Polish military coup would require Moscow's a c q u i e s c e n c e .
To summarise, the PUWP controls Its military through high 
PUWP membership in the officer corps, the political officers, 
political indoctrination, and the internal military security 
services* The Warsaw Pact decision-making structure also con­
tributes to PUWP control over the military,
RELIABILITY
The Warsaw Pact decision-making structure and PUWP controls 
over the military greatly reduce the possibility of the military 
trying to overthrow the Party. Since most conflictual military 
decisions are made outside of Poland, the Warsaw Pact decision­
making structure reduces the possibility of a PUWP-Pollsh military 
split over military policies. Further, Moscow has advocated 
peaceful change of leadership in the past and is not likely to 
support a coup if other means are available,
A successful coup requires the active participation of at 
least part of the officer corps. Yet, most PUWP controls are 
designed to insure the loyalty of the officer corps. The 
officers have shown some internalisation of Party propaganda 
and are not likely to jep'rdlse their privileged economic and 
social positions. The officers are also split by Interbranch 
rivalries. Only *UWP policies which threaten the functioning 
of the military or a sharp split in values is likely to unite 
the officer corp and prompt them to lead the conscripts in a
coup against the Party.
The Polish military is reliable to protect Poland from 
external aggression, especially if the aggressor la a trad-
itional foe: the Germans, Russians, C h e c h o s l o v a k i a n s . "
Poland 18 an undivided nation with a highly patriotic p o p ­
ulation and armed forces. An invasion would he resisted as 
a threat to the nation rather than as a threat to the C o m ­
munist system. Although, the Polish Army was prepared to 
resist Khrushchev and the Red Army's attempt at deciding 
who would rule Poland in October 1956,
The Polish military is less reliable for conducting 
an external offensive a t t a c k . ^  The conscript's c o o p e r ­
ation and committment is crucial and his decision is likely 
to be influenced primarily by Polish society. Polish 
society would have to perceive the external aggression as 
in its interest and not just in the Interest of the PUWP 
and the Soviets. Although they participated in the Csecho- 
slovak invasion of 1968, the Polish soldiers were embarrassed 
and wanted to leave. Poland has no enemies in the West.
Until the imposition of martial law in 1981, scholars 
argued that the Polish military was least reliable for p r o ­
tecting the Party from Internal challenges to its power.
The Party relied on the MO and internal security forces to 
crush the worker demonstrations in 1970 and 1976 because the 
military disobeyed its orders. In 1981, however, General 
Jaruzelskl ordered his troops to participate in the impos­
ition of martial law. Polish military personnel was assigned
primarily to traffic control and patrol duties. ZOMO and 
MO personnel would usually patrol with the regular troops.
MO AND SECURITY FORCES
Official statements and propaganda on the role of the 
Citizen's Militia and internal security forces in Poland 
imply that their role is similar to that of security organ-* 
lzations in other countries. O f f l c i a l l y t the Citizen's 
Militia and its motorized and voluntary divisions help trans­
form Polish society into one which obeys socialist law. The 
MO strengthens the Polish state and socialist democracy by 
maintaining law and order and informing citizens of their 
rights. Official propaganda focuses on the militia's p e a c e ­
keeping role in combatting and preventing c r i m e . ^  Similary, 
the internal security forces, the UB (Urzad B e z p i e c z e n s t w a ), 
fight e s p l o n a g e t sabotage* and subversion by foreign or 
Polish elements to protect the Polish State.
Although the militia and security forces perform these 
official functions, they also perform political functions 
which help the PUWP maintain Itself in power. Public k n o w ­
ledge that the militia and security forces are watching for 
hostile elements,
as defined by the central authorities, curtails an individuals 
speech and behavior for fear of being implicated. This fear 
atomises Polish society. People are conscious of what they 
say in public because they are afraid of being overheard by an 
informant and only reveal their true feelings to close friends.
An atomised society is more susceptible to ideology and central 
pressures for mobilisation.
Knowledge of the activity of the security forces also d i s ­
courages administrators from exaggerating their progress to please 
superiors. The UB's network of Informers provides the Party 
with a check on the Information it obtains from its administration. 
The Internal security service also serves as a supplemental 
supervisory organ which watches over the political orthodoxy,
40pursuits, conduct, and performance of administrators. The 
security organs are also a mechanism for discovering illegal 
organisations, dividing them, and eliminating them.
After proving that the PUWP uses terror to maintain power, 
a description of the organisation, functions, and Party controls 
over the HO and security forces follows. Finally, a brief outline 
of the security forces1 history will illustrate the various tactics
they employ to help keep the PUWP in power.
Although less prevalent than during the Stalinist Era, 
terror la an Important factor in the PUWP*a maintenance of power. 
The lack of groups which publicly and continuously criticise the 
Party, the reaction of Poles when terror t e m p o r a r i l y  subsided
In August 1980, and numerous letters end documents complied 
by KOR support the claim that the Party uses terror and force 
to maintain power, Friedrich axlometically states that "the 
clearest indication of the nonexistence of terror is the 
presence of organised groups that criticise the powers that 
be publicly and continuously. Where this sort of opposition 
is lacking» under modern conditional terror is at work, whether
A 1it be crude and open or subtle and disguised." Except for 
the Roman Catholic Churchi no other group has publicly and 
co ntinuously criticised the regime. The strength of the internal 
security apparatus and terror in Poland is illustrated by the 
fact that both were able to disband the 10 million strong 
Solidarity movement and force its leadership underground. 
Currentlyi the security organs are helping the central authorities 
demoralise Solidarity's leadership and encourage them to emigrate.
Terror's hold on Polish society was revealed by the reactions 
of Poles when it temporarily collapsed during the Polish August. 
The following statements made by Stevens1 interviewees reveal the 
widespread fear that the security forces were able to instill
A 2in the population. Terror made Poles feel lonely and engage 
in doublethink.
"You seethe inside at the Incompetence and in­justice that you aaa all around you. You know thara is an opposition movement, but it takas 
a particular bread of individual to commit social and pr ofessional sucida by openly siding with the enemies of the regime. So you shut up and say nothing, and imagine that you are all alone, or 
at least a small minority. Imagine then, what it la like to wake up one morning and discover that everyone in Poland sees things as you see 
them. Imagine what it is like to open one's brain when for years the only sensible course was to try and close it."
"Even though we Poles are not terribly well disciplined, despite all the political jokes we made, all the fun we had at the expense of the authorities, we had been taught to keep a curb on our tongue."
Finally, there is direct evidence complied by the 
Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) which grossly 
illustrates how the police and Internal security forces use 
force to crush Independent social movements which the Party 
perceives as challenging its power, Peter Rains, in 
Independent Social Mo vements in P o l a n d , has translated 
these KOR documents.*^ These documents include letters sent 
to the Polish government by social activists who were v i c t i m ­
ised by the police and political police for their political 
views and actions. Stewart Stevens, in The P o l e s , has also 
^plied an endless list of individuals beaten or abused by 
the police and security forces. Some of these cases which 
occurred from the end of February to the middle of Hay 1980, 
are reproduced verb at im below:**
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War£aw$ Wikton Karpinski and Krsysstof Lackowski, 
students of tha Warsaw Polytechnic, beaten and tortured at the Warsaw Foliee Headquarters; Sergius* Kowalski, natheaatlcian, beaten in the face at the Warsaw Police Headquarters; Tomas Michalak, photographer, kicked down 
the stairs at Warsaw Police Headquarters and afterward stripped naked and beaten, also on the head; Aleksander Hall, historian, hit in the nose for refusing to give 
evidence; Jersy Godek, student of musicology, beaten and then jailed for thirty days with two homosexuals who molested him; Januss Gwosdsiewskl, beaten and stifled at Warsaw Police Headquarters to make him agree to cooperate with security forces; Januss Jarost, beaten and dragged into a police car; Marek Respond, kicked and karate-chopped and his beard and moustache set on fire;
Marek Keslowskl, male nurse, beaten in the kidneys and liver; Zenon Palka, seriously beaten while in police c u s t o d y .
Gdansk! Bogdan Borusewlcs, historian, beaten during detention; Piotr Bystrsanowski, student, Maciej Grsywscsewskl, student, Januss Karolik, Mlro si aw lyblckl, and Tadeus 
Sscsudlowski, historian, all brutally beaten and kicked after attending an illegal celebration of the anniversary of 3rd May Constitution of 17 t l . Bystrsanowski was after­
ward beaten in a police car and threatened with death, then left unconscious, abandoned in the suburbs. After the same celebration, Nina Mllewska was also beaten and her elght- ycar-old son dragged by the hair.
A major factor motivating the PUWP to use terror to 
maintain power is its belief in the infallibility of Marxism- 
Leninism. The PUWP believes that Ma rx ism-Leninism is scientific 
since it is based on the forces of dialectical materialism.
"Since history tells the totalitarian he is right, he expects 
all others to agree with him, thereby vindicating the correctness 
of his historical insight. All normal members of society will 
naturally be part of that unanimity. Only scattered misfits 
remain outside that unanimity, possibly joined by a few 
t r a i t o r s . S u c h  misfits, traitors, and others stand in the 
way of progress and must be eliminated. Indeed, "this system
because of alleged ideological infallibility la continuously 
tempted to increase terror by violent passion for assent for 
u n a n i m i t y .
terror also has political spillover effects. When the 
opposition is eliminated, one's loyalty to the Party is no 
longer indicated by simple membership but by one's activity 
within the organisation and contributions to it. In the 
personal files of party members there is a record of whether 
the individual is an active or passive member. MA remark on 
someone's file that he is passive represents a major question 
mark as to his d e d i c a t i o n . Such remarks will prevent an 
individual from being assigned a nomeklatura position or 
obtaining economic privleges.
The Party leadership is surrounded by members who 
enthusiastically support the regime for Ideological or economic 
reasons, or out of fear. As the Party's leadership is cut off 
from society, they are deluded into believing that this support 
is representative of society. The leadership becomes emboldened 
and feels justified in repressing opponents who they believe do 
not have the support of the p e o p l e . T h u s ,  ideology# delusion, 
and greed motivates the Party to use terror to stifle opposition.
ORGANIZATION
The Citicen's Militia and the Internal security organisations 
including the Ug, are administered by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs. The Minister of Internal Affairs is assisted by the 
Commander of Border Guards and Internal Security Corps; the 
Commander of the Citlsen's Militia; and two colonels respons­
ible for the protection of Party and government officials! and 
arms warehouses. The Minister is also assisted by four vice- 
ministers who are responsible for the 17 departments through 
which the UB operates.
The Commander of the Border Guards and Internal Security 
Corps is responsible for about 80!000 men divided among the 
Border Protection F o r c e s 9 Territorial Defense U n i t s f and
/ oInternal Security Bodies. The Commander of the Citlsen's 
Militia is responsible for over one-half million men: the
regular police force, including traffic police and criminal 
police ( 1 5 0 t000); the riot police (ZOMO) 22,000; and the 
Voluntary Police Reserves (ORMO) 350, 00 0.50 The latter two 
divisions are paramilitary organisations which crushed worker 
street demonstrations in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and imposed 
martial law in December 1981. At the provincial and communal 
level, the local MO commanders report on their activities to 
the local council and administrator. The local administrator 
is empowered to mobilise the MO to protect the PRP's Interests.
The various elements of public and private life all have 
an appropriate cell within the Ministry of Internal A f f a i r s .* *
There are 17 departments within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 
Officially, each department if fighting against espionage, sab­
otage, and suverslon in each area. Actually, each department carefully
supervises its ares of competence end intervenes whenever 
it observes deviation from the Party line. Through the 
security agents and informers who work in these departments 
at the national and local level, the Party is able to supervise 
the pervasive state administration and Poland's political and 
social organizations. The Party will also detect its opposition
and work to eliminate them. The departments through which the 
UB and its Informers operate are listed b e lo w:52
1st Department - Responsible for counterespionage anddisinformation directed against foreign agents and their activities.
2nd Department - Responsible for archives. Here corre­spondence from abroad is censored. C o ­
operates with Censor's Office.
3rd Department - Flgnts underground movements. R e ­pressive measures used by police 
designed to 1) Isolate activists from people at larges 2) hinder free flow of uncensored information; and 3) 
make expansion impossible.
4th Department - Supervises light Industry, banks andcooperatives.
5th Department - Supervises political parties otherthan PUWP, trade unions, and youth o r g a n i s a t i o n s •
6th Department - Supervises operations of prisons and
labor camps.
7th Department Conducts espionage abroad.
8.h Department - Supervises land, water, and air transport.
9th Department - Supervises heavy Industrial, chemical,
and mining Industries.
10th Department - (abolished c. 1956 ) investigatedpurity of Party leader . Conducted counter intelligence against rightist* 
nationalist* and Trotskyist factions. Operated own investigation department and villa prisons.
11th Department ~ Supervises activities of RomanCatholic Church and other religious o r g a n i s a t i o n s •
Investigation Department - Investigate security cases nothandled by the 10th Department.
Department of Protection of Government - Assigns bodyguardsto Party and Government Officials.
Signals Department - Monitors all telegraph and telephoneconnections with foreign countries and services teletypes. Monitors foreign 
radio stations and jams Western broad­casts.
It is clear that the Internal security network Is as pervasive 
as the State administration. It enables the Party to 
supervise most aspects of life in Polish society.
CONTROLS
The Party carefully supervises the internal security 
forces to prevent them from becoming Ma state within a st at e11 
as occurred during the late 1960's when they were under the 
leadership of Mlecsyrtaw Moccar. The Party apparatus parallels 
the internal security organisation to Insure that It does not 
abuse its power. The Minister of Internal Affairs reports d l ? * c 
to the Politburo on all the security activities of the Ministry*
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Including the most confidential matter*, and tha Politburo 
reviews all security agents. The Politburo must approve all 
charges brought against high ranking Party and government 
of f icials .
A so-called special sector was created within the PUWP 
Central Committee to supervise all personnel and political 
matters w i th in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This special 
sector is subordinated to the Politburo. The special sector 
is divided into two sections. The first section, the Personnel 
Section, is responsible fo~ all promotions and transfers of 
security agents. The Minister of Internal Affairs can only 
promote or transfer agents after his action has been approved 
by the Personnel Section, the Secretariat, and the Central Com­
mittee respectively. This triple check is designed to ensure 
that the Mini st er does not build an army of loyal security 
officers through patronage and subsequently use them to seise 
power. The second section, the Political Section of the Security 
Corps, deals with all problems of Party training and ideological 
indoctrination.
At the province level, the local Security Chief reports on 
his activities to a special cell within the Province PUWP 
Executive. This cell, appointed by the Central Committee, is 
usually composed of the local First Secretary and two other PUWP 
members. This cell must approve every move made by the security 
apparatus. The Party cell must be informed of any charges made
Against a Party member, Stats employee, or othsr luportant 
functionary In ths aconoalc apparatus, factories, or workshops.
The Party cell approves Investigations, chargss, and the 
recruitment of new party meabers into the security network.
Party appolntaents, high PUWP membership, and special privilege 
for security officers contribute to PUWP control of the security 
apparatus as well. As Indicated In Tabs 3.1, the leadership 
positions of the security apparatus are on the nomenklatura 
of the Central Party organs. Security officers are subject 
to Party discipline and scrutiny since, for example, 97 percent 
of the policeaen In the NO are PUWP aeabers. Moreover, security 
officers have access to the finest sports and training facilities. 
Thera are 9 nursery schools and several rest hoaes and hospitals 
reserved for exclusive MO u s e . T h e  MO officials have r.ccess 
to better housing. Their salaries are also higher than that of 
industrial workers. The average wage In the Warsaw garrison 
Is 8700 softy per aonth while the average industrial wage Is 
6892 sloty per aonth. With each proaotlon a police officer's 
salary Is raised SO sfbty per aonth and It Is raised 100 sloty 
per month for every 3 years of service.55 The Party controls 
the security apparatus by supervising its work, appointing 
Its leadership, encouraging party membership, and providing 
economic incentives.
A brief outline of the history of the security fdrcea will 
illustrate how the apparatus works, recruits members, and
deals with opponents of the r e g i me .56 Between 19,19-1953, 
the Polish political police (Bespleka) and the Internal 
Military Security Forces ( I n f o r m a c j a ) » formally within the 
Ministry of Public Security, were closely linked through 
personnel and supervision with the Soviet M V D . Direct 
control of the Polish internal security forces enabled S t a l $ n 
to insure that his recently Installed Lublin Committee 
followed his orders for capturing power between 1944-48.
Later, Soviet control of the Polish security forces insured 
that the PUWP did not deviate from the domestic and foreign 
policy line of the CPSU. Soviet control of the security 
apparatus is evidenced by early recruitment difficulties 
among intellectuals since they vl' .*ed the appartus as an 
instrument of foreign domination, the removal from power of 
Wl ad y s l a w  Comulka in 1931 for his excessive nationalism, and 
the creation of the 10th Department in c. 194S to keep the 
leadership of the PUWP itsislf under s u r v e i l l a n c e ».5 ?
The Soviets had difficulties recruiting native Poles 
for the security apparatus and were forced to rely on m i n o r ­
ity groups and the uneducated. Since the Soviets could not 
infiltrate Polish society with Russians because of the la ng­
uage barrier, they tried to recruit native Poles for the 
Polish security apparatus. The Polish Worker's Party (later 
PUWP) was very small and provided few recruits. Recruitment 
among intellectuals was difficult because they viewed the 
apparatus as an Instrument of foreign domination. Many intellectuals
refuaed to cooperate becauaa tha Party and ita aponaora were 
hoatila to tha Pollah non-coanuniet foreaa, auch aa tha AK, who fought 
for Poland'a llbaratlon fron tha Naala.
Thaaa faetora forced tha Sovlata to racrult aaong Poland'e 
■lnorltlaa and unaducatad. In addition to poaaaaalng tha 
nacaaaary languaga akllla, many ainority racrulta fait anlaoaity 
toward tha old political ordar In Poland, which thalr racrdltara 
axpolltad. Tha Sovlata racrultad aaong tha Java for aaaapla.
Many Poliah Java wara offandad by Pollah rallgloua and aeonoalc 
antl-Saaltlaa. Thay ballavad or wara convlncad by Sovlat 
propaganda that tha Coaaunlat aovaaant would lncraaaa aoclal 
juatlca in Poland and raaova conaarvativa Pollah Antl-Seaitida 
fron powar. Othara joined tha Baapiaka aftar baing offarad 
natarlal privilege* or having thalr angar awakanad. Tha Sovlata 
racrultad many Jawa aftar aubtly expoliting thalr angar toward 
anyona who had tha alightaat connection with the daatruction of 
thalr fanlllaa and proparty during tha holocauat. Thaaa Jawiah 
ex-coaaunlata, aynpathlaara, or caraariata wara placed Into 
high and niddla level aacurlty poaitlona. Thia policy of 
recruiting ninorltiaa and placing than Into vlalble aacurlty 
poaitlona would help tha Connunlata deflect public critician 
aacurlty apparatua abuaaa fron thenaelvea onto tha ninorltiaa.
For lower level poaitlona, tha Sovlata recruited aaong tha 
poor, unaducatad, and politically inexperienced. Thay offarad 
poor rural atudenta tha opportunity to receive higher education for
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•Imply Informing. It was subtly hintsd to many rural 
racrulta that thia was tholr chanca to vant thair fruatratlona 
and inferiority coaplsxsa via a via thair mora affluent and 
•ophlatlcatad collaaguas from the big cities. * Other 
uneducated or politically nalva individuals vara convlncad that 
what thay wara doing was no different from what other regiaea 
ware doing, or that the inevitable good that will raault from 
communlat leadership Juatifaa the means used to insure 
successful communlat consolidation of power.
Bespleka and its network of informers was assigned the task 
of infiltrating every stratum of Polish society to discover hostile 
•laments and to sound out public opinion. The Bespiaka's goal 
was to install one full-time Bespleka functionary, with a network 
of informera in every political, economic, and social Institution
( AIn Poland* For example tha Batplaka'a 10th Department 
monitored the PUWPfs top leadership through bugging, infiltrating 
inner committees, end exploring the peet of these dignitaries* 
Instead of sounding out public opinion through the press or radio, 
the Party used the Bespleka to gather information. Finally, the 
Bespleka used mass arrests to perpetrate terror and to turn its 
officers into ruthless executors of its demands.
Although the Polish population revolted against the 
totalitarian police state in October 1956, they were soon placated
when ; ..... Gomutka was selected PUWP First Secretary and
the Soviet advisors and Jews were removed from the military
and security apparatus. Ths security apparatus did not undergo 
serious refora baeausa the population lost Interest after its 
aost unpalatable features were reaoved. Gonu-lka had already 
once been reaoved froa power by the security forees and his 
appolntaent of Nlecsystaw Mocsar to lead the renaaed Mlniatry 
of Internal Affairs in 19S6 would contribute to his second 
downfall in 1970. Although its advisors ware reaoved froa 
the security apparatus, ths Soviet Union still aalntalned 
influence in the appartus by preaotlng inner alnlstry revelries 
and helping the aabltious Mocsar in his quest for power after 
Goaulka fell froa Moscow's favor in the nld-1960's.
As Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mocsar 
announced a new orientation for the security apparatus. The 
task of tha Ministry of Internal Affairs would become prophylactic! 
to prevent the disease of bourgeois attitudes froa entering 
Poland especially through those who have contacts in the Hast. 
Mocsar said that the "aain task of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs should consist of knowing of eventualities liable to damage 
nation and country. The task of the Cltisen's Militia and security 
service should consist of coilacting vast knowledge of theee
60eventualities, froa which ths nssd for preventive action stems."
Subsequently the number of informers em ployed by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs doubled. In 1*63, the nemesr of informers
wee 300,000 compared to 150,000 during the Stalinist per let.** 
Informers were trained and assigned to low level jobs, such as
lot
secretaries in offices, from which they informed the 
Ministry about thair supariors and contacts* The informer's 
low wages ware supplemented by special bonuses.
The March events revealed some of th* tactics used by the 
security apparatus and provided Mocsar with an opportunity to 
capture power. Frustrated by the worsening economic situation 
and the increasing censorship of the central authorities, students 
and others demonstrated after the final showing of the banned
r m f f f m t J . i l . X y a - The police responded to this protest by
beating at least 35 demonstrators. Later, to perpetuate 
violence and to step into power in the chose, M o c s a r 1■ troops 
provoked demonstrators into attacking them. G o m u l k a ’s fifth 
column speech, which blamed the chose in Poland on cosmopolitlan 
Zionist elements, legitimised the abuses of M o c s a r 1s security 
apparatus.
To root out antlsoclallst forces in Poland, the secret police, 
in extreme cases, tried to recruit students known for their 
dissident inclinations for clandestine organisations run by 
professional agents and provneateure. More common was the practice 
of recruiting young students--gemerally from the countryside or 
smell towns as Informers. They were lured by material a d v a n t ­
ages and perks such as higher grants, housing privileges, rapid 
academic promotion, and better paying jobs in large cities. Law 
enforcement students were encouraged to become Informers to acquire 
on the job training.
If not for his ill remarks toward the Soviets, his excessive
nationalism* and international events, Mecsar would hava 
aucceaafully usad tha security apparatus to capture tha Party 
leadership. However, Edward Giarak, tha technocrat from Silesia* 
was chosen for tha Party leadership after tha December 1970 
riots. Realising that Gomutka's lack of control over tha security 
apparatus lad to his ouster on two occasions, Giarak would insure 
that ha had tha loyalty of tha security forces. "Indeed,
Giarak outdid all other East European leaders in his invastaants 
in tha police. Ha was insensitive enough to grant tha police 
force all possible privileges and flaunt this favoritism before 
the whole nation.
After initially promoting vigorous economic growth* Gierek's 
economic policies resulted in serious balance of paymaats 
problems which forced the regime to cut back its plans for 
growth and attempt to salvage the growth which had occurred. 
Nevertheless, society's expectations had been raised. These 
growing economic problems, combined with Glerek's attempts "to 
further the socialisation of Polish society" resulted in a 
turning point for the worse in 1976. The regime and society split 
over the following proposed constitutional amendments: r e ­
cognising the PUWP as the leading force in Polish society, 
tying c i t l s e n 's rights to the performance of their duties, and 
recognising Polish-Soviet relations as an unshakeable fraternal 
bond.*^ Although these amendments were subsequently dropped 
or toned down a deep split was formed. The split was further
deeperded by the government's confiscation of private lands 
not farmed by the owner and their incorporation into the 
collectiviced sector. When the Gierek regime announced price 
Increases of 60 percent and higher for meat and other items 
in 1976, the Polish workers rose in protest and flowed into the 
streets demanding that price hikes be removed or rolled back 
to 10 percent.
Some demonstrations turned into violent protests with d e m ­
onstrator* looting and burning state property. Although the 
security forces showed restraint while fighting the demonstrators 
on the street, they vented their anger and frustrations on those 
demonstrators who were arrested and Interrogated after the riots. 
Subsequently, the courts handed down harsh sentences for some 
demonstrators and virtually Ignored countercharges of police 
brutality. Some of the friends and relatives of the punished 
workers formed the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) 
in September 1976. KOR was an organisation which landed economic, 
medical, and legal help to dismissed workers or to the families 
of the imprisoned workers.
After a prudent initial response, the regime slowly stepped 
up its opposition to KOR. The security forces increasingly 
hassled KOR and the other organisations which arose to help the 
victims of human right, violations and to protest against such 
violations. As the independent social movements in Poland began 
to grow in response to Poland's various problems which the authorities
f a i l e d  to a d d re ss ,  so did p o l i c e  abuses and r e p r e s s io n s  grow.
KOR and other o r g a n is a t io n s  recorded p o l i c e  abuses a f t e r  
v e r i f y i n g  t h e i r  a c c u ra c y .  To i l l u s t r a t e  each p o l i c e  t a c t i c  
used to break up the s o c i a l  movements in  Poland with a case  
example would be a long e x e r c i s e .  C onsequently ,  t he present  
author w i l l  only l i s t  these t a c t i c s .  T h is  l i s t  of t a c t i c s  
was complied from KOR r e p o r t s . 6* The aim of these t a c t i c s  were 
to I )  I s o l a t e  the a c t i v i s t s  from the people at l a r g e ;  2) h inder  
the f r e e  flow of uncensored in fo rm a t io n ;  3) make the expansion  
of these groups Im p o s s ib le .
1. Activists did not have their passports renewed.2. Convicted activists were sent for psychiatric t r e a t m e n t •
3. Demonstrators or activists were forced to take "health trots" through a guantlet of police and security personnel who kicked them and beat them with their t r u c h e o n s •
4. Activists were beaten and tortured-some resulting in death.5. Medical reports were forged to cover up beatings.
6. Security officers were "soaked" before confronting demonstrators so that they would swing their truncheons mercilessly
7. Activists were suddenly dismissed from their jobs.8. Middle-aged activists and some who were handicapped were drafted into the military.9. Activists were subject to harrassment and petty c a j o l e r y •10. Searches without warrants.11. Blackmail,
12. Trials in camera.13. Activists were threatened or subject to psychologically disturbing r e m a r k s •
14. Telephones were bugged.15. Private mail was opened.16. Surveillance,17. Intimidation.
18. Blacklisting.19. Apartment evictions.
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20. Papers and typewriters were confiscated during apartment searches.
21. Activists were held t o t  48 hours, released, and detained over and over again.22. False information was citculited on R0R stationary.
23. Authors were barred from publishing their books.24. Judges were pressured to recall activists for retrall and raise their sentences.
Even the judicial system was abused to punish social 
activists. The next chapter examines how the PUWP controls 
the judicial system in Poland.
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CHAPTER 4: THE JUDICIARY
The PUWP in building socialism in Pc and through the e n ­
forcement of the rule of law. The PUWP realises that the "law 
is a useful mechanism for coordinating the activity of social 
organisations, for reorganising economic l l f e t and instilling 
new ideas on purpose of social action in the minds of the 
p e o p l e , C o n s e q u e n t l y i  the Party turns its policies for 
social reform into laws and enforces them as laws. The PUWP 
Politburo formulates the general guidelines for social reform 
in Poland. The PUWP Secretariat and the State administration 
formulate specific administrative laws and regulations on the 
basis of these guidelines. The Sejm approves these a d m i n ­
istrative laws and makes them the law of the land.
Subsequently, the State administration Implements these 
laws. The Party and security apparatus ensure that the a d ­
ministration implements these laws through various control 
devices. Finally, the judiciary in Poland resolves the c o n ­
flicts arising under the law.
The judicial system is responsible for the administration 
of justice in Poland. Unlike the judiciary in the United 
States or most West European statesi the Polish Judiciary 
neither interprets the law nor judicially reviews the law.
The PUWP through the Council of State interprets the law 
in Poland. The judiciary does not have the power to tell 
the PUWP that its laws are Improper or unconstitutional. Once 
properly promulgated by the Sejm, the law is binding on the 
courts. T h u s , the primary role of the courts is to establish
- 1 1 8 -
the facts of a case and to apply the correct lavs to settle the 
dispute •
The courts are a symbol of rationality and Impartiality.
The judges and People's Assessors listen to the facts of the 
case as presented by the prosecutor. S u b s e q u e n t l y , the judges 
and assessors decide vhich statutory lav vill settle the dispute. 
Should the dispute occur In an area where the lav is silent, 
the judges vlll base their decision on common sense, similar 
cases they have adjudicated in the past, and the needs of 
society and Its political system.
The courts as symbols of rationality and Impartiality 
contribute to the Party's maintenance of power. The great 
majority of cases handled by the courts are not political.
Host citizens or enterprises turn to the courts to help them 
settle their grievances with other citizens or enterprises.
The parties rely on socialist lav, vhose roots lie in the 
Western tradition of lav, to protect their interests. Sim­
ilarly, they obey the courts' decisions based upon socialist 
lav. By using and obeying socialist lav to protect their 
Interests, the citizens are symbolically stating that they 
accept lavs formulated by the Party to Influence their daily 
lives. Concurrently, the citizens are being politically 
socialized to follow socialist law and to contribute to the 
building of socialism in Poland.
Despite the fact that the courts are a symbol of impar­
tiality , they are an instrument of the Party contributing 
to the maintenance of its power* The Party uses the courts
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as administrators of the lav, the State, and a d > nistic
ideology to bring about socialism in Poland. "The te and 
the lav serve to eradicate completely and finall ■ remnants 
of capitalism in the economic system, develop class
2conscienceness of the p e o p l e v to create the conmur society." 
The courts protect the P a r t y ’s accomplishments. Article
58 of the PRP Constitution states that the courts are the cus-
, 3todlans of People's Poland, its property, and interests.
Moreover, the courts are responsible for further improving the 
centrally administered economy. "The courts are to inform the 
administration of transgressions discovered during court pr o­
ceedings or of inefficiencies of organisational structures and 
their departments vhich facilitate transgression or cause in­
justice by facilitating their manifestation."^
In addition to administering justice and protecting 
P e o p l e ’s Poland, the courts also socialize the population pol­
itically into accepting socialist lav and the rule of the 
PUWP. The courts conduct their political socialization function 
through three broad spheres of action: 1) fostering public
participation in the administration of justice; 2) developing 
preventive and correctional programs; and 3) strengthening 
the socialist legal culture in Poland. After discussing the 
court's political socialization function, the author vill d e ­
scribe the structure of the administration of justice in Poland 
and the controls the Party employs to make it serve its ends.
The Party encourages citizen participation in the admin­
istration of justice to Insure that Poland is governed on the 
basis of the rule of lav em4 to educate the citizens by allovlng
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then to participate In meaningful activity. Undoubtedly, 
the party also encourages participation to give citizens 
a feeling that they are contributing to the development of 
Poland. Citizen participation strengthens the legitimacy 
of the S t a t e 9 and thereby the Party, in the eyes of the pa r t i ­
cipants and is a public statement of at least their tolerance 
of the status quo. Moreover, the more people the Party can 
draw into active participation with the State, the greater the 
likelihood that its policies will be implemented.
Citizen participation in the administration of Justice is 
encouraged through participation in the People's Assessor and 
People's C u m  ter programs, and through the related activities 
of social organizations. The People's Assessor has a function 
similar to the jury In the United States. As a member of the 
community, he represents the symbol of trial by one's peers 
and legitimises the court's activity by symbolizing that an 
offender's actions had not just been committed against the 
law of the state but against the community as well.
During trials in the provincial and communal courts, the 
People's Assessor takes part in the hearing, questioning, and 
sentencing of offenders. He has the same rights as a judge 
(Art. S9, sec. 104). A candidate for local assessor is 
nominated by the Front of National Unity (FJN) and formally 
approved by the local council. Criteria for becoming an 
assessor are to be devoted to socialism by class origin and 
PUWP affiliation and participation.^ The assessor's role is 
explictly defined as so ci a l i z e r - e d u c a t o r •
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Citizens can also participate In the prosecution of a 
case. P e o p l e ’s Curators work with the P r o c u r a t o r ’s office*
They help investigate crimes, prepare cases for t r i a i 9 and 
help insure that the court's decisions are i m p l e m e n t e d .
In 1977, the Ministry of Justice created the Council 
for People's Cooperation with the Administration of Justice 
(CPCAJ) to de ve lo p new means by which citizen participation 
in the administration of justice could be increased. This 
council is composed of representatives of the P e o p l e ’s 
Assessors and Curators. Various social organisations also 
send delegates to CPCAJ. The Council informs the Ministry 
of Justice of the successes or failures of current programs. 
CPCAJ also advises the Ministry on participatory matters and 
submits proposals for increased cooperation.
Przemyslaw Mackowiak, in Rocsnik Polltycsny 1 C o s p o d a r c s y 
19 7 9 # reports ■ that CPCAJ has helped some social organisations 
develop programs to increase cltisen participation in the a d m i n ­
istration of justice. The Association of Sober Drivers has 
introduced a course on the judiciary and cltisen participation 
into its educational program. The Main Technical Association 
and the Union of Socialist Youth have prepared handbooks on 
cltisen participation in the judicial system which they have 
distributed among their members and affiliated organisations.
Numerous organisations have discussed possibilities for 
increased cltisen participation at their plenary meetings.
Other organisationsi such as the Trade Unions, have sent 
delegates to conferences o i  judges. Conversely, representatives
of Che Administration of Justice have participated in the 
plenary session discussions of provincial trade union o r g a n ­
izations as well as the executive meetings of social o r g a n i s ­
ations. Court representatives have also addressed social 
groups on Increased citizen participation in the administration 
of justice.
The second sphere of the political socialization activity 
of the Judicial system is its prophylaxis and correctional pr o­
grams. Respectively, the purpose of these programs is to p r e ­
vent violations of the law and to rehabilitate offenders. "The 
aim of the prophylaxis programs is to eliminate factors which 
promote the violation of legal n o r m s . " 7 The prophylactic 
activities are carried out in many walks of life (family and 
workplace), among various groups (children, juvenile delinquents, 
criminals) and at different geographical levels according to the
gcrime to be prevented.
An example of a prophylactic program is the occasional judge 
and worker conference. Judges visit large industrial e n t e r ­
prises and address meetings of workers on factors which facll* 
itate the manifestation of crime and the disru$t!6n of work 
norms. The activities of anti-socialist forces are also d i s ­
cussed. These judge and worker conferences are coordinated with 
special broadcasts and articles on the enterprise radio and 
newsletter services.
The judges have alro lent legal advice and guidance to 
the special citizen's control committees established to study 
serious societal problems. Through the study of these problems, 
the committees hope to formulate proposals for preventative
* • . ■■ ■ . ■ . ■■■■..
action.
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“ In the sphere of civil a f f a i r s 9 the committees have
concentrated their Investigations on al co ho lia a and its
effects* the waste of resources and p e o p l e fs labor* violations
of the legality in the adainistration of state f a r a s 9 and
oproblems in the construction and agricultural sectors.*1 In 
other areas, the committees submitted proposals or guidelines 
to industrial associations* procurators* and party o r g a n i ­
sations for dealing with environmental problems* traffic pr o­
blems and cadre selection policy. These guidelines have been 
incorporated into court judgments and periodic State a d m i n ­
istration analyses.
According to Prsemyslaw Mackowlak* the Administration's 
activities in the correctional sphere are also substantial.
The broad aim of the correctional departments is to re ha bi l­
itate individuals alreadyln conflict with the law. In 1977* 
for example* the correctional departments helped resociallse 
301*639 offenders: 117*385 adults* 41*934 minors* and 142*526
c h i l d r e n . 10 These departments are committed to developing new 
rehabilitation programs which do not Involve Incarceration. 
Concurrently* the punishments for serious crimes have been 
i n c r e a s e d •
The j u d i c i a r y 1s final political socialisation function
is shaping and spreading the socialist legal culture in Poland.
The task of the judiciary in this area includes educating the
citlsene in the spirit of fidelity to People's Poland* teaching
them observance of the rule of law and work discipline* end
care for state p r o p e r t y . 11 The administration of justice
12accomplishes these tasks through:
1. C ry in g  ca se s  on t h e ir  n e r lt a .
2. p o p u la r is in g  s o c i a l i s t  law through the d ir e c t  c o n ta ct  
o f a d a ln is t r a t lo n  c i v i l  s e rv a n ts  w ith  w orkers and o th er  
■ ca b e rs  of s o c ie t y .
3. c o o p e ra tin g  w ith  the a a ss  a e d ia . The a a ss  a e d la  w i l l  
d e te ra ln e  what I s  the b e st an g le  fo r  b ro a d c a st in g  le g a l  
and co u rt  Is s u e s  so th at they nay have m axlaua e d u c a tio n a l 
la p a c t  on the p o p u la t io n .
4. b ro a c a s t ln g  j u d i c i a l  o p in io n s . T h is  In c lu d e s  the Judges  
p u b l ic ly  announcing o p in io n s  and t h e ir  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  d u r­
in g  open c o u rt  ca se s and a f t e r  c lo s e d  co u rt t r i a l s .
When d e c is io n s  a f f e c t  la r g e  e n t e r p r is e s  or o th e r I n s t i t ­
u t io n s ,  they are  posted in  p u b lic  p la c e s  w ith in  those  
I n s t i t u t io n s  fo r  the w orkers to re a d .
5. e s t a b l is h in g  e d u c a t io n a l p ro gra a s co o rd in a te d  by the 
A ssoc le t lc n  o f P o lis h  Law yers and taught by ju d g e s .
The co u rse s  fo cu s  on the ro le  of law In  s o c ie t y .  These 
c o u rse s  em phasise the need fo r  u n f a i l in g  observance of 
c o l l e c t iv e  r u le s  and le g a l  norms as a n e ce ssa ry  c o n d it io n  
fo r  a Ju s t  and c o n f l i c t l e s s  developm ent o f s o c ie t y .
T h u s, the A d m in is tra t io n  of J u s t ic e  conducts i t s  p o l i t i c a l  
s o c ia l i s a t io n  ta s k s  through c i t i s e n s  p a r t ic ip a t o r y  program s, 
p r o v e n c e * Ire -c o r re c t  to n al program s, and the p o p u la r la a t lo n  of 
s o c i a l i s e  legs'! c u lt u r e .
Tbs jw d ir le / y  a d m in is te rs  j u s t i c e  and s o c i a l i s e s  the pop­
u la t io n  p o l i t i c a l l y  through a system  of t r a d it io n a l  and 
s p e c ia l is e d  c o u r t s .  Tbs J o r i s d ic t io n ,  t a s k s ,  and g e o g ra p h ic a l  
lo c a t io n  o f the r ra d ir .ls M i and s p e c ia l is e d  c o u r ts  in  Poland la  
d e scr ib e d  f i r s t .  T h is  d is s u a s io n  io  fo llo w e d  by « c o o p e ra tiv e  
a n a ly s is  o f the a a ch a n ia a s  the PliWP e a p le y s  to  c o n tr o l the
c o u r t s .  Tha prsw ar P o lis h  j u d i c i a l  s y a ta a  w i l l  b# d e scr ib e d  
to I l l u s t r a t e  bow the now p ro ce d u re s In tre d u ce d  by ebs Coo- 
n u n is ts  c o n tr ib u te  to t b s i r  c o n tro l of tb s a d a ln is t r a t lo n  of
j u s t i c e  In  P o lan d .
THE COURTS 13
The Supreme C o u r t ? The Supreme Court is constitutionally re ­
cognised as the highest judicial organ in People's Poland and 
is responsible for supervising the activity of all other 
Courts (Art. 61 (1)). The Supreme Court is composed of 104 
judges divided into four branches: the C i v i l 9 Work and Public
Safety, Criminal, and Military Branch. The Supreme Court is 
governed by the First President of the Supreme Court and four 
branch presidents. The Court's leadership is appointed from 
among the judges (Art. 61(4)). The Council of State appoints 
all judges for a term of five years. Judges are also recalled 
by the Council of State vhen convicted of a crime (Art. 60(1-2).
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction for cases in­
volving serious crimes. Espionage and treason are the highest 
crimes and carry the severest penalties. "Severe punishment 
is provided for serious c r i m e s ." The Supreme Court is also an 
appellate court for the provincial and military courts. The 
Supreme Court can reconsider "force of lav decisions" made by 
these lover courts in their appellate jurisdiction. H o v e v e r f 
emly the Minister of Justice, the Chief Public Prosecutor, or 
the First President of the Supreme Court can initiate the p r o ­
cess for the Supream Court to revlev the "force of lav" d e c ­
isions mode 
1m
by e  lever courts in 
to hearing
proeedamu P
C s o r t  may be
a p p e lla t e  j u r i s d i c t i o n  
d is p u t e s ,  the Supreme 
the a d a ln ie t r a t le a  o f  
* the C o u rt ensuere  le g a l  
ashed to c l a r i f y  a la p e l
.c. . ■ -■ 41 ' ’ ■
code which has raised concern among the cltlsenry or resulted 
in conflicting opinions Issued by two or more courts* The 
Court may be asked to clarify the code by providing an example. 
Unlike the judicial system in the United States where the 
courts are prohibited from giving advisory o p i n l o n s 9 the 
Polish Supreme Court can clalfy laws it will subsequently use 
to settle disputes.
provincial and Commune C o u r t s : The Provincial and Commune Court
resolve the civil and criminal matters of civilians only.
These courts rely on local codes in making their d e c l s l o n s f al ­
though there are a number of systemic principles and guidelines 
to which they must adhere. Provincial courts consider serious 
crimes under their original jurisdiction. Provincial court 
decisions in their appellate jurisdiction have the force of law.
When hearing cases in their original jurisdiction* the 
local courts are assisted by People's Assessors. As mentioned 
earlier * the assessor participates in the hearing* questioning* 
and sentencing of defendants: they have rights equal to that
of judges (Art. 59)1-4)). Ihe provincial court judges are 
assisted by two assessors. A majority vote is required to 
lielde a case.
The following are th« specialised courts of People's 
P o l a n d :
The Supreme Administrative C o u r t : The Supreme Administrative
Court specialises in protecting cltisens from bureaucratic e x ­
cesses and the crimes of government officials. Pormally* the 
President and Vice-President of the Supreme Administrative
■ :£. i : . ' . .  'S:,i ~ S k s "»:r -v?'fi A
Court are nominated by the Minister of Justice and appointed 
by the Council of State. The other judges are nominated by 
the Minister of Justice and approved by the Council of State 
also. The judges of the Supreme Administrative Court have 
qualifications similar to those of the judges in the tr ad it i­
onal courts: 1) Polish citizenship; 2) legal studies and
working knowledge of public administration; 3) impeccable 
character; 4) promise of obedient fulfillment of duties.
Courts of Work and Public S a f e t y : There are 17 Work and
Public Safety Courts (WPSC) and they settle employee versus 
employer disputes arising from matters of work. Examples of 
such disputes include liability for personal Injury! sick pay, 
and entitlement benefits. The WPSC also receive appeals from 
rental and arbitration commissions, the appellate judgement 
of the WPSC in these cases is final. tn if71, the W$SC decided 
64,893 cases.
In adjudicating these cases, the Judges and assessors 
m u s t :**
"protect socialist work relationships using labor laws: this means taking into c o n s i d e r ­ation behavior and attitudes which facilitate the completion of the enterprises tasks; and strengthening the rule of lav? in accord with 
the norms of the labor code, and the consistent, and Just political order."
"Realisation of these goals will strengthen and spread in 
the eyes of society the rules of socialist society; nearly 
1) the interdependence of workers rights and duties, 2) the 
principle of just pay for the natality and quantity of work 
completed, 3) the obligation of employees to help employers
••If-actualize, and 4) the protection of state property. 
Military Courts: T he military court system consists of g a r r i ­
son courts, regional military courts, and the Navy Court.
The military court «ave original jurisdiction for all crimes 
committed by military personnel. These courts also have 
original jurisdiction for espionage committed by civilians 
or military personnel. Cases are adjudicated by one judge 
and two military officers of higher rank than the defendant. 
State Iconomic Arbitration C o m m i s s i o n ? Economic disputes 
between enterprises, institutions, and organizations are 
settled by the state economic arbitration commissions. At 
the national level, the Supreme Arbitration Commission settles 
disputes between state enterprises over contract violations, 
late deliveries, and defective supplies. Arbitration commission 
at the local level settle similar conflicts. State arbitrators 
have qualifications similar to local Judges.
Family C o u r t s : These courts were established in 1978. The
family courts settle all civil and criminal disputes arising 
from marital, child care, or divorce problems. In 1978, the 
family courts decided 366,984 cases.
Councils of Misdemeanors: These councils are found in c o m m u n ­
ities or attached to local administration offices. The 
councils de^l with misdemeanors such as disturbing the peace, 
indecent behavior, petty theft, and petty speculation. The 
councils are composed of three members which must decide 
ail cases by majority vote, the councils have the power to 
aiimas fines from 196 to 6,006 zloty end distribute jail terms
from one to three weeks. Appeals must be directed to the 
local courts.
P e o p l e '8 Courts: These courts are not part of the state 
judicial system. Founded in 1965, the task of the P e o p l e d  
Courts Is to teach society to respect law and order. The 
People's Court sentences are intended to be educational, not 
punitive. These courts hear cases of individuals charged 
with violating the rules of communal living; neglecting 
citizen's duties, law, or family; maintaining a poor attitude 
toward work; disturbing the peace at home or at work; or 
failing to show respect for state or private property.
The People's Courts are located in economic enterprises 
or villages and towns. The People's Courts located in the 
enterprises are appointed by the enterprise's Workers Council, 
the Conference of Worker Self-Government, or at a general 
worker's meeting. These courts only deal with misdemeanors 
committed by workers not the enterprise's director or his 
a s s i s t a n t s .
The People's Court located in communities are called Unity 
Commissions. Nominations for the Court's members are submitted 
by the FJN to the local council for its formal approval. Unity 
commission members must be 26 years of age and possess an impec­
cable character. Cases can be brought before the People's Court 
by the commission)themselves or local citizens.
The purpose of these courts is to work for peace and 
unity within the comm un ity— to settle local disputes according 
to objective laws. The Unity Commission's sentences may
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require an exchange of apologies between disputants, a rein* 
bursement for damages, or a donation to a social cause of up 
to 300 zloty. If these corrective measures fail to settle a 
dispute, the commissioners may introduce it into the local 
state court system regardless of the fact that they have 
already issued a sentence.
ANALYSIS
Groth and other scholars argue that the prewar Polish
Judiciary was autonomous and Impartial despite Marshall
1 7Pilsudski's attempts to influence it. Moreover,
Grzybowski argues that the fundamentals underlying socialist 
courts and law are rooted in western legal thought. He further 
argues that socialist courts can be compared to non-socialist 
courts, ° Thus, this analysis will compare the prewar Polish 
judiciary to the current socialist administration of justice in 
People's Poland to determine how the PUWP controls the courts.
Insight into how the Party controls the courts in People's 
Poland can be gained by comparing them to the prewar Polish 
courts. As is the case now, the prewar judiciary did not base 
its decisions on case law and it did not have the power of ju di­
cial review. The prewar judiciary decided cases on the basis of 
statutory law which, once properly promulgated by the Sejm, was 
binding on the courts. The autonomy of prewar courts was guar an­
teed by the provision, with some exceptions, that the decisions 
of higher courts were not binding on the lower courts. Lower court 
decisions could be reversed by successful appeal to a higher court 
however. A similar situation exists in People's Poland today.
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"the independence of Che prewar Polish judiciary was 
constitutionally safeguarded and buttressed by the a d m i n ­
istration and organisation of the courts."*^ in prewar 
Poland, the Minister of Justice with the nomination and consent 
of the judges would appoint, promote, or transfer them. Judges 
could only be recalled after a court conviction*
The decisions of prewar judges were not subject to review 
by non-judicial bodies. For example, the prosecutor and police 
were barred from any control over the courts. Similarly, the 
government could not place economic pressures on the judiciary 
since its salaries were separately administered. The influence 
of political parties on the prewar judges was reduced by a law 
which proscribed the judges from participating in partisan 
p o l i t i c s .
Since 1950, the PUWP has changed or dropped many of these 
administrative and organizational safeguards that protected the 
autonomy and, thereby, the impartiality of the courts. These 
changes and the new controls introduced by the Party have 
historically shown to be sufficient to produce the pressures 
needed to convince the judges to decide political Issues or 
cases in the Party's favor. The judges no longer participate 
in the appointment, promotion, or transfer of judges within the 
judicial system. Formally, the Council of State, either with or 
without the nomination of the Minister of Justice, appoints 
judges for terms of five years. Some judges, such as those 
who serve on the People's Court, are nominated by the FJN and 
approved by the local council.
Actually, the PUWP appoints the judges through its nomenklatura 
system. The following judgeships are on the nomenklatura of the
of the central and local party o r g a n a : * 0
Table 5.1: Judgeships on the nomenklatura of centraland local party organ*.
Politburo
1, first President of the Supreme Court.
S e c r e t a r ia t
1. Presidents of the branches of the Supreme Court.2. President of the Supreme Arbitration Commission.
Central Committee
1. Presidents of provincial courts.
Provincial Central Committees
1. Vice-presidents of provincial courts.2. Presidents of commune courts.3. Regional presidents of state economic arbitration c o m m i s s i o n s .
Commune Committees
1. Vice-Presidents of commune courts.
The conflict of filling judgeships by both the formal and 
nomenklatura process is resolved in favor of the Party organs. 
The members of the Council of State consult with their colleag 
in the PUWP Politburo and Secretariat before filling positions 
on their nomenklatura list. Similarly, before nominating 
judges for local positions, the FJN consults with the local 
party organs in a process not unlike that of finalising a slat 
for local council elections. Thus, the Party appoints loyal 
and reliable judges for key positions within the judiciary.
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Groth states that the Minister of Justice, with the 
approval of the Council of Ministers can remove, demote, or 
transfer judges as easily and arbitrarily as other bureau-* 
crats. The duty of the judge to protect People's Poland and 
work for the "unity and progress of socialism" is vague and sub­
ject to intepretation which may facilitate the removal of judges 
who fall to decide cases from the Ma rxlst-Leninlst perspective 
or are unsympathetic to the Party line. The threat of not 
being reappointed for another 5-year term, not receiving a p r o ­
motion, or being tranferred to a small town with few amenities 
may put sufficient pressure on the judges to decide in favor 
of the Party's views In the small number of political cases 
which arise. The judges can also be threatened financially 
since their salaries are no longer separately administered and 
hence subject to political police abuse. Indeed, the judicial 
appointment, promotion, removal, and transfer policies In People's 
Poland provide the Party with instruments for pressuring judges 
to decide political cases "correctly."
Unlike the case in prewar Poland, the de cisions of lower 
courts can be reviewed by higher courts upon the initiative of 
non-judicial organs. For example, the appellate decisions of the 
provincial courts can be reconsidered by the Supreme Court should 
such a request be made by the Minister of Justice, the First 
President of the Supreme Court, or the Chief Public Procurator.
The Procurator's office is a non-judicial organ subordinated 
to the Council of State. The PUWP Politburo can effectively 
pressure the Procurator to initiate a review of an u n s y m p a t h ­
etic decision made by a lower court since he is dependent on
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the Politburo for his job. The Procurator's Office has also 
usurped the power of the judiciary by removing the power to 
issue warrants and conduct preliminary investigations from 
its purview. The lack of judicial supervision of searches 
and investigations has lead to abuses in political ca^es by 
the Procurator's Office.
Socialist Poland's judiciary is also subject to extra* 
legal influence. In addition to basing their decision in 
disputes on statutory law, the judges must consider the 
official directives proclaimed by the Party. Isydor Hodelskl 
found that in 1954, "it was officially proclaimed that the 
directives of the Party are guiding principles for the activities 
of the courts and all agencies of the entire administration of 
justice." This statement further supports the argument that 
the Party is the State since its proclamations are to be 
treated effectively as the law of the land. Needless to say, 
the Party's proclamations may be in its own Interest and 
should not have influence in the allegedly impartial courts.
Moreover, the judges are not to be politically impartial 
when making decisions. "Since 1950, socialist legality requires 
an unmistakable partisan subjectivity on the part of judges and 
courts, calling them to be conscious Instruments of party policy 
and active promoters of the new socio-political order in 
Pola nd ."2* The correct political bias of the judiciary is in­
sured since a great majority of the judges are Party members 
and hence subject to Party d i s c i p l i n e . There is also an 
Indirect and general education of the judiciary in Marxism- 
Leninism. Initially the Party was forced to rely on bourgeois
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jurists to staff Its courts. By 1950, however* the PUWP
was able to replace most bourgeois jurists with communist jurists.
"Communist oriented political vigilantes, not impartial lawyers,
2 6become the prised leaders of the new legal system."
The proliferation of specialised courts has also un d e r ­
mined the power of the current judiciary relative to the prewar 
Polish judiciary. Groth argues that the current standards for 
judges are less demanding than those required of prewar judges.
The lower standards are partly the result of the need to 
recruit more individuals for the various specialised judgeships 
in Poland. Many of the judges may not v i ew their appointment 
as i life time occupation but rather as a stepping stone for 
future advancement and may subconsciously be less committed to 
their work.
The proliferation of courts also results in some variation 
in the manner in which cases are conducted. This undermines 
the prestige of the courts and may result in individuals picking 
and choosing where they want their cases tried. The less pr o­
fessional courts in the communities are also subject to political 
police pressure to harass local activists who are unsympathetic 
to the regime.
The judiciary system in Poland is the arm of the Party. The 
Party makes the courts subservient to Its needs by appointing its 
members, removing unsympathetic members, reviewing its judg­
ments through non-judicial bodies, and requiring its members to 
approach disputes from the M a rx ls t-L en lni st perspective. A l ­
though political control of the courts is not necessary for the
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great majority of nonpolitical court cases, the controls do 
exist and are employed In cases which threaten the hegemonic 
power of the PUWP.
The Experiences and Future Discussion Group made the
following observations concerning the Polish judiciary:
"The period of repression following the events of June 1976 showed how easy it Is In Poland to return to the old system of show trials, which In reality were 
political, by exerting the requisite pr e ­ssures on the courts."27
Further, the Group observed:
"The dropping of proceedings against privileged persons, severe treatment of people who cannot afford pr of es s­ional council--these have become c o m m o n . " 2®
"Neither the prosecution or judicial bodies perform their tasks in a way that inspires public confidence that the rule of the law Is being observed."29
The PUWP controls the Sejm, the State Administration, and 
the Polish judiciary effectively making itself and the State 
one. The PUWP Is so firmly entrenced in the State bureaucracy 
that nothing short of overthrowing the state will remove it from 
power. Similarly, the PUWP controls most other social, political, 
and economic organizations in Poland. An example of how the 
Party controls non-state organs, specifically the Polish mass 
media, is the subject of the next chapter. Examining how the 
Party controls the mass media will further illustrate the p e r ­
vasive control the Party has over Polish society and how <t is
organizations to maintain its power.able to use other
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CHAPTER 5: THE MASS MEDIA
A regime's political power is enhanced by controlling access to and the kinds 
of information available to its subjects. The Communists realise that words and 
symbols influence a person's values, opinions, and world view. Similarly, they 
realise that the amount and quality of information available to society will in­
fluence its development, consciousness, and activity. Thus the Communists control 
access to and the types of information presented in their societies with the goal 
of convincing their subjects to accept soci »;it values and mobilising them to 
work toward the attainment of Communism under their leadership.
Of the various types and channels of information available to a communist 
society only the mass media^especially they Party presa^will be considered here.
Only the mass media will be considered because "theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism and 
present leaders of Communist Parties invaribly call the mass media the most import­
ant tool, the sharpest weapon of the Party in the battle of the minds of the 
people."*
An examination of Marx1st-Leninat Ideology will illumir>te why the PUWP 
controls its mass media. Ixaminlng a single issue of the main PUWP daily, Trybuna 
Ludttt will reveal some of the techniques the Party uses to socialise its readers 
politically* Finally describing the various mechanisms the Party employs to con­
trol the mass media will enable the reader to understand how the uniform world 
view presented in the mass media is attained.
That the Polish mass media must serve the PUWP follows directly from Marxlst- 
Leninlst ideology.2 Marx claimed that the dialectical forces of historical 
materialism will inevitably lead to the establishment of Communism. Lenin further 
developed this theory by adding that the dialectic process can be accelerated by 
the revolutionary actions of a vanguard party. Lenin claimed that for the vanguard 
party to be successful it must, among other things^ persuade the masses of the 
correctness of its actions.
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Thus After capturing power in the successful “Polish Revolution” with the 
aid of the Red Army, the Polish Communists took control of the mass media to per­
suade the masses of the inevltableness of the “Polish Revolution” and the correct­
ness of its policies. The Party media informed the public that the factors Marx 
described as necessary for a socialist revolution were present in Poland and that 
the aid of the Red Army helped bring the revolution to fruition. Moreover, through 
the mess media the Party kept the Polish masses informed of how its policies were 
eliminating class conflict, harnessing the benefits of the scientific-technological 
revolution, and enacting the rule “from each according to his ability to each 
according to his needs.” Through the mass media the Party mobilises and agitates 
for the effective implementation of its policies.
The Party uses the mass media, in addition to informing and mobilising the . . 
masses,to instill socialist values in the masses and then >y accelerate the attain­
ment of Communism. Through the mass media the Party undertakes the formidable 
task of destroying bourgeois values in the young and old of Poland and replacing 
them with Communist values. The Polish Communists believe that the Polish masses 
are hindered from achieving Communism by their agrarian perspectives; their 
generally anti-Russian attitudes; and their nationalistic, Individualistic, 
religious, and superstitious tendencies.^ By attacking these values, re­
peating socialist slogans, and reporting on the benefits of socialism, the Party 
believes that it will slowly replace bourgeois values with: 1) acceptance of the
Soviet style of industrialisation, 2) love of the Soviet Union and admiration of 
all Soviet things, 3) support for the Party's unlimited rule, 4) disdain for the 
station's past as bourgeois decadent, and 5) acceptance of a materialistic world 
view.*
finally, the FtIWP must control the press so that the enemy does not. Lenin gave 
the Polish Communists practical guidance when he said “freedom of the press in the
democratic senna cannot be allowed In communist Russia because it would mean 
facilitating the task of the adversary, helping the enemy. We do not wish to find 
ourselves committing suicide, and for this reason we shall not introduce freedom 
of the p r e s s . M o r e o v e r ,  the Polish communists claim to know the correct amI 
scientific truth to historical and economic development. Other approaches are not 
correct and thus are banned. The Polish communists believe that allowing the enemy 
a voice in the press will only distract the masses from their pursuit of communism.
The communists must control the media to expose the lies and vagracles of capitalistic 
life and thereby strengthen the masses' committment to socialist values. To summarise, 
the PUWP believes that it must control the mass media to convince the masses of the 
validity of Marxism-Leninism, Inform chem of its policies and accomplishments and thus 
build legitimacy, politically socialize them into accepting pa4V supremacy, and prevent 
any challenges to its power.
Given this special view of the mass media and its functions, it follows that 
the PUWP would have a special conception of what is newsworthy. Paul Lendvai adeptly 
summarised the communist conception of news: "What is newsworthy is basically any­
thing which can be used to illustrate current party policy or economic progress."6 
This conception is radically different from the western conception of news as concise 
and objective reporting of events. Information for information's sake Is not news 
in communist states. All news must agitate for something.^ News mist be reported 
from the Marxist-Leninist perspective, extol the wisdom of the Party, and constructively 
criticise those who have not effectively implemented its policies. Consequently, the 
Party press reprints the speechs of Party leaders verbatim, announces changes in policy, 
and illustrates Party accomplishments. It does not print items which challenge the 
authority of the Party. Seldom does it print items which cast the Party in a bad 
light, such as admission of mistakes or even accidents.
Virtually every issue of the PUWP press contains articles which illustrate how 
the Party uses the press to maintain power. The January 12, 1983 issue of Trybuna 
Ludu was randomly selected and searched for articles which illustrate the Party's 
attempts to 1) create a new socialist man; 2) mobilise the masses; and 3) spread 
the communist world view.
CREATING SOCIALIST MAN
The underlying massage of the following news items is for the reader to realise 
the value of becoming a socialist man. The news items inform the reader that socialist 
man is not concerned solely about himself but about his community, workplace, and state 
as well. Socialist man approaches problems from the Marxist-Lenlnist perspective.
He cares about state property and understands the historical materialism of 
Marxism-Leninism»
Work Tlme-A Time For Work- Trybuna Ludu's Moscow correspondent reports that a group of workers in the Paris Commune Shoe Fractory took it upon themselves to Increase worker discipline and thereby raise pro­ductivity and cut costs for their factory. The workers, convinced of the truth that discipline fosters productivity, intend through good example and advise to convince fellow workers of this truth. To reduce absenteeism and Increase work discipline, the 
workers have agreed to collectively Judge requests for days off. Their Increased discipline has enabled their plant to save 5 million square decimeters of 
leather during 1982.
A short article calls upon workers to care for 
state Issued protective clothing and footware to extend their useful life and conserve Poland's precious resources.
PPR; THE 11RTH OF A PROGRAM Richard Nasarewics chastises the West and others who believe the socialist revolution in Poland was foreign imposed. He cites the growth of the Polish Workers . Party before 1944. He points out that the conditions Marx indentifed as necessary for a revolution existed in Poland: high ievel of cultural and economic development.
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class conflict*  a history of so c ia lis t  thought 
in tha XIX and XX century* and tha coincidence 
of tha Party's program with tha aspirations 
of tha nation. Thasa factors when combined with 
tha lib aratin g  Rad Army and it s  program of ln te r-  
national communism insurad tha success of tha 
Polish revolution.
MOBILIZATION
Tha following are examples of news items through which tha PUWP triad to 
mobilise certain sectors of tha population. Successful mobilisation of tha masses 
would enable tha Party to accomplish tha followings 1) hasten tha implementation 
of it s  p o lic ie s; 2) increase public participation in policy implementation and 
give people a feeling they are contributing to Poland's development; 3) promote 
p o lit ic a l so cia lisatio n ; and 4) increase it s  legitimacy by allowing people to 
participate in governance.
IT  DEPENDS ON THE WORKERS:
This a r t ic le  argues that i f  workers want 
to re a lise  "worker-managed facto ries* they 
mist jo in  the new trade unions. The a rt ic le  
points out that before So lid arity  called for 
worker-managed factories* a manifesto of 
o f f ic ia l  union a c tiv is ts  called for sim ilar 
changes.
TOGETHER ON AGRICULTURAL MATTERS 
This a r t ic le  c a lls  for farmers to bring into 
production co st-e ffic ie n t reserves. For it s  
part* the Party and government w ill eliminate 
barriers to crop rotation and the expansion 
and bequeathal of private farms. The government 
is  allowing agriculture c irc le s  Increased autonomy 
and allo cating more Investment funds for Improving 
the agricu ltu ra l infrastructure.
APARTMENTS FOR TEACHERS
Trybuna Ludu is  helping schools provide apartments 
for teachers. The paper is  encouraging persons with 
suggestions on how to solve th is problem to c a ll  a 
given telephone number.
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PROPAGANDA
Party propaganda la daflnad aa "the oral and preaa explanation and die-
asemination of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the policy of the Party.' More
broadly, Party propaganda is an attempt to creat a favorable image of the communist
world. Party propaganda is characterised by: permanent, intensive, and consitent
repetition of simplified political messages; and reflective of every change in
oforeign and domestic policy. It is moat effective when presented as news.
The photographs and articles in the selected issue of Trybuna Ludu attempt 
to create the image of People's Poland as a state concerned with raising the stand­
ard of living of its cltlsens, promoting public participation, and caring for social 
justice. The West is portrayed as biased, war mongerlsh, and plaqued with economic 
and political problems.
Photograph of mechanic working in Nysle Truck 
Plant. Caption says that Nysie is  f u l f i l l in g  
it s  economic plan of producing 14,500 delivery  
vans up 2.5 thousand from the previous year.
Photograph of two workers constructing an a l l -  
Polish photocopy machine. Caption announces that 
Poland w ill  no longer have to Import sim ilar  
machines suggesting that Poland is  becoming more 
s e lf-s u ff ic ie n t  and advancing technologically.
Photograph of children at a New Year's Eve Party. 
Caption indicates that the party is sponsored by 
the state-run House of Culture and outlines sch­
edule of future ch ildren's events.
Increased L iv in g  Standards Through Higher Prod­
u ctiv ity .
Work D isc ip lin e  and Rational Organisation Means 
Higher Productivity.
THEY FOUND THEMSELVES
The Lublin and Krosnle M ilit ia  report that 
Solidarity  leaders Jan Nakoniecny and Roman 
Tamowski reported themselves to the m ilit ia  
aftar being in  hiding since December 13, 1981. 
After explaining their whereabouts, they were 
released.
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THEY SEE ONLY WHAT THEY WANT TO SEE 
New York Timss' reporting implies that 
tha arraata of dissidents for d istributing  
periodicals since tha l if t in g  of m artial lav 
la a vio lation  of thair c iv i l  r ig h ts. Tha 
reporter cheatisea tha Timas for fa ilin g  to 
point out that tha printing and d istribution  
of periodicals without state permission la always 
i l le g a l.  The reporter adds that propggranda guide­
lines in the West prohibit it s  media for reporting 
that Poland's authorities have been lenient toward 
workers arrested for strik in g  after the imposition 
of m artial law.
American D e ficit Bomb About To Explode
U.S. Conservatives C rlt lse  Concessions in Arms 
Negotiations with USSR
U.S. IN DEFENDANT'S SEAT AT NONALIGNED NATION'S 
CONFERENCE
CRISIS DESPITE FULL SHEVLSS:
Oversealous competition between West German and 
Japanese video recorder manufacturers resulted 
in 12 m illion machines produced for a demand of 
8 m illion . Consequences are layoffs and dumping.
Moreover» West Germany experienced a 43% Increase 
in bankruptcies in 1981. Germany w ill  probably 
violate GATT to mediate it s  present d if f ic u lt ie s .
The PUWP employs many mechanisms to orchestrate th is  unified picture in the 
mass media. These mechanisms can be grouped into three broad categoriess 1) 
personnel appointments and cadre policy; 2) recommendations and directives  
regarding the main lines of propoganda policy; and 3) censorship and re strictio n s  
on the dissemination of information. Before turning to a discussion of the sp e cific  
mechanisms within each category! the author w ill elaborate on the^ftrueture of the Polish  
media as well as the obstacles broadcasting "unofficial" information*.
At the apex of the h le rarica l mass media structure is  the PUWP Politburo and 
Secretariat. In weekly closed meetings! the Politburo formulates broad and sp e cific  
guidelines on how Issues should be presented and propagranda structured to meet the
* ■
doM .de and external ln fo n atlo n  need, of tha PUP.10 Tha Politburo foraulataa
It s  guidelines based on information each member receives from his power base, 
suggestions transmitted by the Party and government hierachies, and the dictates of 
the p o lit ic a l environment. Subsequently, the Politburo member who doubles as the 
Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee Department of Press, Radio, and Television, 
translates these guidelines into sp e cific  directives and relays them to the mass 
media bureaucracy.
Central news agencies help the PUWP insure that the entire Polish mass media 
follow the Party lin e , convey a uniform picture of l i f e  in Poland, and correctly  
signal changes in foreign and domestic policy. Through it s  77 branches located in  
Poland and foreign cap ita ls, the Polish Press Agency (PAP) provides central and 
regional newspapers with uniform a rt ic le s  about Party events, international events, 
foreign delegations v is it in g  Poland, and government press releases. Indeed, PAP 
often receives a rt ic le s  and speeches, with headlines, ready for domestic and 
foreign d istribution  from the Party press or government m in istries. Since so much 
in  Poland is  shrouded in  secrecy^ PAP's extensive organisational framework enables 
i t  e f f ic ie n t ly  to obtain clearance from the relevant authorities before d istrib u tin g  
news items.
In addition to transmitting information f i t  for broadcasting and thus serving 
as a "gate" regulating the release of news, PAP compiles, processes, and d istributes  
special information b u lle tin s. Decision-makers in Poland cannot rely on the mass 
media as one source of.objective information upon which to make decisions.
Certain information is  not published in the mass media to protect people from 
suggestive and provocative ideas of the West and to eliminate co n flictin g  news and 
opinions which threaten the existing system. ^  Consequently, PAP prepares special 
information b u lletins which contain a l l  uncensored information (White PAP) and others
which contain less censored Information for distribution among top party and
12government o f f ic ia ls .
Other Polish news agencies which help the Party convey information include the
Polish Agency Interpress (PAI), the Press Photo Agency (CAP), National Publishing 
Agency (SAW), and the Youth Publishing Agency (MAW). PAI provides foreign news­
papers and others with reports, books, magazines, and photo feature films about Poland 
in English, Russian and French. CAP supplies photos to the Polish and foreign 
press. The two publishing agencies prepare books on social and political topics, 
records, and posters for adults and youth respectively. Through these news agencies 
the party controls the image of Poland within and outside of Poland.
Another major segment of the Polish mass media structure is the PUWP's central 
dail^ Trybuna Ludu. The central Party dally is the ideological and political guide 
for the media as a whole.** Trvhiina Ludu serves the Politburo and Central 
Committee which formulates policies for Poland. The newspaper's editor in dhief 
is a member of the Central Committee and maintains direct contact with Politburo 
members should any policy or information questions arise. Similarly, its department 
editors have contacts in the Central Committee and occasionally within the Politburo 
itself•
The Central Party daily dominates the press by being the first to break major 
news stories and having the largest circulation. Trybuna Ludu breaks important 
news stories first to establish how a news item should be treated and to promote 
the image of the attentiveness of the Party. Trybuna Ludus planned circulation 
is much larger than the planned circulation of the UPP and DP central dallies.
Trybuna Ludu's circulation is 1,220,000 copies dally, while that of the UPP's 
Dalsnnlk Ludowy is 200,000 and the DP's Kurler Polakl is 170,600 copies dally.**
That the Trybuna Ludu's circulation is 85X larger than Dsiennik Ludowy.'a is not 
a reflection of popularity. The PUWP's Central dally, as the organ of the leading 
party, is simply allocated more paper and other supplies than the other papers.
The local newspapers, radio, and television constitute another segment of
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the mass media. Currently, the PUWP has 17 regional newspapers with a circulation 
of 3,647,000 copies. Of the two other official parties, only the Democratic Party 
has a regional daily, the lllustrowany Kurier Polskl, with a circulation of 
120,000 copies dally. The total circulation of the non-Party, Independent, and 
Catholic dallies is 2,485,000 copies. The PUWP's newspapers dominate the local press 
which is charcterized by a heavy reliance on central press agency releases and double 
and triple supervision. Similarly, radio and television is supervised by special 
committees and the Government Press Office.
The PUWP has good reason to maintain more than a single newspaper. Following 
the resonlng of the Bolsheviks, many newspapers promote the image of a lively press 
and socialist democracy. Some of the newspapers are aimed at special audiences 
which facilitates the penetration of propaganda and socialist values. Moreover, 
the risks of conflicting views or opposition to the Party line have been reduced 
by systemic safeguards.
An examination of the legal and practical restrictions on the freedom of press 
and independent publishing in Poland is edifying. The Constitution of the PRP 
in Article 83 (1) states "that the PRP guarantees the freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, procession, and demonstration to its citizens.*1 However, by Article 
83(2), this freedom of the press is effectively limited to official working groups 
and PUWP controlled organizations since only "working people and their organizations 
have the right to use printing shops, paper, and public buildings." The working 
groups' freedom of the press is limited to supporting the state because Art,84, (3) 
states that "establishing or praticipatlng in associations whose aim or activities 
are against the political or social structure or legal order is banned." The working 
groups' freedom of the press should also fulfill their duty to the fatherland (Art. 67 
(3))* Thus, freedom of the press is limited to PUWP recognized organizations which
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must use their freedom to promote socialism in Poland. The all encompassing phrase 
"activities against the political or social structure or legal order" allows the 
PUWP much discretion in limiting the freedom of the press of unsupportive groups9 
however defined.
The practical restrictions facing individuals or groups trying to spread in­
formation to a large number of people in Poland are formidable. Except for the 
Catholic press and the independent underground publishing companies, i.e. (NONA), 
the state owns all publishing facilities in Poland. The Worker's Publishing Cooperative 
(RSW) prints virtually all the newspapers and periodicals published in Poland.
Materials to be published by the state-run publishing houses will be submitted to 
the censor's office. The censor's office and publishing agencies employ a number 
of tactics to curtail the circulation of unsympathetic views beyond simple deletion 
of harmful material or outright suppression. Authors submitting sensitive material 
to state publisher8 may be turned away for such reasons as "your work does not fit 
our profile" or "publishing your work now would endanger a more important literary 
work." Further, sensitive materials may be delayed in publishing, printed in smell 
editions, or changed by additions. Although an author may turn to independent 
publishers such as NOWA to have his material published, he runs the risk of being 
blacklisted and never having access to state publishing facilities again.
Although NOWA has mysteriously managed to publish a significant number of 
uncensored books and materials, large scale unofficial publishing is most 
difficult. Paper is not privately sold in quantities necessary to publish a book.
It must be stolen or purchased on the black market at an exhorbltant price.
Private possession of copy machines, stencils, and ink is illegal. Moreover, .ae 
items are scarce in Poland. Administrative rules require copies made on state
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photocopy machines to be recorded. Individuals who undertake independent 
publishing are forced to break many laws and will serve heavy penalties when 
convicted by the authorities.
PERSONNEL APPOINTMENTS
The foundition of the PUWP's control over the mass media, is its control 
of the selection of the leading personnel which staff the mass media bureaucracy* 
As in other sectors, the PUWP employs the nomenklatura system to staff the 
leading positions within the mass media. The more important the position within 
the mass media, the higher the Party organ responsible for filling and super­
vising it* For example, the Politburo appoints the editor in chief of Trybuna
Ludu. The following list of nomenklatura positions and the Party organs 
responsible for staffing them was complied from PUWP Central Committee documents***
PUWP Politburo
1. Editors in chief and their deputies at . Trybuna Ludu and Nows 
Droni
PUWP Secretariat
1* Editors in chief, deputies, directors of PAP, PAI, CAP, Kronlka Filmows.
2. Editors in chief and deputies of Zycle Partii, Chlopska Progs, Ideoloaia 1 Polityka.3. Editor in chief of all quarterlies, monthlies, and weeklies*4. President, deputies, general directors of committee on Rac'o 
and Television Affairs*5. General directors of Polish Radio and Television.6* President and secretary general of Society of Polish Journalist and the Union of Polish Writers*
Provincial Party 8*cr*tarlat
1.
2.
Editors in chief, deputies, and secretaries of regional 
Party press.Editors in chief and directors of regional publishing houses*
* s m  UflfflttUlE, (continue)
3. Editors in chisf and deputies et Polish Radio and Television stations.
Table 5.1: Nomenklatura Positions In Mass Media
The appointees to the nomenklatura positions are politicians first and 
medlamen second. Most of the editors in chief have proved their political skills 
during their work in primary party positions. They have demonstrated their party 
nimdednese and ability to speak in prescribed lies which shields the party from 
criticism and r e a l i t y . C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  they will approach the news from a 
subjective point of view: they will report the news from the Marxlst-Leninlst
perspective, and work to preserve the supremacy of the Party.
"These nomenklatura individuals are given special privledges to underlies 
their status and to cut them off from society both as a reward and as insurance 
that their loyalty to the Party remains intact."** The editors in chiefs and 
directors of newspapers use exclusive hospital and resort facilities, and enjoy 
unquestioned priority in obtaining new apartments and cars. These individuals 
also receive the White PAP to bolster their status. Many of these nomenklatura 
individuals are candidates for further promotion assuming they continue to be 
loyal yes men and perform their responsibilities satisfactorily. Should they 
not perform satisfactorily they will be reprimanded, demoted, and in extreme 
cases blacklisted. It is likely however, that high party officials or nomenk­
latura members who fall from the favor of the central authorities will be assigned 
to leas lucrative positions in a different sector. Once a nomenklatura official, 
the individual is likely to be provided for life.
The Party relies on three mechanisms to control the journalistic community 
working within the Polish mass media. These three mechanisms are: high PUWP
membership, control of access to the journalist community, and the Journalists 
Association of the Polish People's Republic (JAPPR).
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Given the communist conception of neve, the functione of the aeee media,
end the PUWP's view of the journalist ee ite "close and unfaltering ellieet"
it ie an unwritten requirement that journalists be PUWP members. Indeed,
"the journalist profession has the highest concentration of PUWP members
Party membership and participation in its activities will help create journalist
cadres: "Journalists who.possess high political and class consciousness,
understand the political lines of the Party, accept it as their own, are able
to put it into practice, and are capable of answering for it and fighting for
20it, and able to align themselves correctly in any situation." Journalists who 
are members of the PUWP are subject to the Party's political socialisation and 
discipline.
As with other state sectors, the Party controls access to the journalist 
profession* The number of students admitted to Poland's only Department of 
Journalism at Warsaw University is regulated by the central planners. The 
planners have overestimated the demand for journalists which has resulted in 
there being more journalists than jobs. Consequently, enrollment at Warsaw 
University has fluctuated and occasionally no new students are admitted.21
The planners' oversetimation has strengthened the Perty's control over 
potential journalists. In 1954, there were 1,500 applicants for 175 fefcts.22 
Rigorous . examinations and interviews over a two week period are used to care 
fully screen candidates. Moreover, the coursework at the University is very 
demanding of students. There are many candidates for the seats of those who 
cannot handle the rigorous training.
Since 1955, strong emphasis on practical training has resulted in Poland 
producing the Eastern Blocks beet journalists. Until 1955, political training 
was emphasised as the Department of Journalism operated under the philosophy 
that "a journalist must know what to write and that how to write it will develop
naturally." Currantly tha journalism student is trained in the mechanics of 
journalism while in s c h o o l . P o l i t i c a l  guidance is largely provided by the 
Party and the JAPPR. During his first year, a journalism student is taught the 
theory and practice of journalism and learns to write letters to the editor» conduct 
lnterviews» and report accidents. During the second year, he learns to write 
more sophisticated articles such as film and book reviews. In his third yearf 
the student chooses an area of specialisation and writes a thesis. Throughout 
his college career, the journalism student spends at least one month a year working 
for a newspaper. His responsibilities rise with his advancement in school.
A special commission assigns the newly graduated journalists to specific 
newspapers. Positions with newspapers in the major cities are awarded to students 
who have demonstrated ability in illuminating the Party line, reporting on the 
progress of socialism! and criticising without questioning the fundamental premlsae 
of the status quo.
After being assigned a position, there are positive and negative incentives 
encouraging the journalists to follow the Party line. Devoted service will bring 
further raises to the journalist's salaryf already slightly above that of an 
industrial worker9 and possibly access to better housing and an automobile. The 
journalist realises he can be easily replaced. Should he become blacklisted! he 
will never obtain a job in the journalism field again.
Although party membership and control of access to the profession are formidable 
control measures9 the Party also uses the JAPPR to control the journalism profession. 
Closely supervised by the PUWP Central Committee Department of Press, Publications! 
Radio, and Television, the JAPPR's objective is to "Integrate the journalistic 
community around the alms that serve the supreme Interests of the socialist state 
and build professional credibility.MW  Among the JAPPR's tasks are: 1) representing the
Journalists* Interests In darling with ths ctntrsl authoritits and lntarnatlonal 
community; 2) striving for public cradibility; 3) cooperating with the Party 
to provide for journalists1 welfare; and 4) training and educating journalists.26
Should the JAPPR fall to perform its objectives and tasks or deviate from 
the Party line it may be purged or dissolved as its predecessor* Prior to the 
establishment of the JAPPR in March 1982, the Polish journalists were organised 
into the Polish Journalist Association (PJA) founded in 1957* Since it was 
founded, the "PJA had served as a loyal, and most of the time as a loyalist 
supporter of the existing political system."26 However, with the liberalisation 
following August 1980, the PJA and its leadership began to call for greater press 
autonomy and relaxation of censorship* The PJA did not attack the foundations 
of the status quo in Poland. Nevertheless, some of its orthodox members broke 
off, founded the JAPPR, and began to criticise the actions of the PJA as neither 
serving the Interests of the Polish state nor of the journalist community* After 
the imposition of martial law and a well orchestrated press campaign, the PJA was 
dissolved and the*JAPPR recognised as the official organisation for Polish Journ­
alists*
The PJA was dissolved because it was critical of the authorities and not 
setting a proper example for the journalistic community. The new JAPPR, however, 
has publicly declared its loyalty to the regime and constitution, and that it will 
work with the authorities to normalise the situation in Poland.
In addition to supporting and implementing the central authorities*policies, 
the JAPPR sponsors educational and training programs and purges bourgeois elements. 
The JAPPR supplements the practical training journalists receive from Warsaw 
University with short courses in Ideology and political matters* The JAPPR's 
journal also publishes examples of proper reporting techniques* The JAPPR warns 
against degeneration to bourgeois tactics of reporting for information sake.
Currently, JAPPR le requiring Journallate to sign loyalty oathe to the regime 
and releasing those journalists who do not sign the statements.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND DIRECTIVES27
The PUWP's staffing of key media positions with loyal individuals facilitates 
the implementation of its reconaendatlons and directives for the main lines of 
prop .ganda and information policy. The PUWP Informs the mass media of prop^anda 
and information policies either indirectly or directly. The Party guides the mass 
media indirectly through public statements or directly through confidential 
meetings and communiques.
The media leadership indirectly learns how to approach certain Issues or 
structure prop ganda policy through speeches and resolutions passed at ideological 
conferences, Party Congress, Central Committee meetings, or specifications in 
the 5-year economic plan. Occasionally* former First Secretary Edward Gletek' 
Informally meet with journalists and commentators and reveal his expectations.
An example of indirect guidance of the mass media Includes the resolution passed 
at the Sixth Congress of the PUWP held in December 1971, which called for better 
defined jurisdiction!between administrative bodies, less central Interference in 
local affairs, and modernisation of state administration. This resolution was a 
signal to the mass media to report on unclear administrative Jurisdictions and 
their 111-effects, to reprimand authorities who overstep their jurisdictions, and to 
agitate for the reform of the state administrative structure.
The direct, confidential guidance of the mass media on a dally or weekly 
basis is a more significant control mechanism thafc the Indirect mechanism* In 
this direct control mechanism, members of the Politburo or their representatives 
regularly meet with the editors in chief of the major newspapers and relay the central
157
authorities9 guidelines for dealing with issues or upcoming events. Similar 
meetings are held at the local level.
The Politburo and the Secretariat determine the broad and occasionally the 
specific guidelines for dealing with domestic, foreign, and economic Issues. 
Similarly, guidelines for internal and external propoganda are established. For 
example the regime established four general guidelines for the Polish mass media's 
coverage of the Pope's visit to Poland in 1979. These guidelines were: 1) present
the Pope's visit as merely a religious event; 2) present the Pope's visit as a 
symbolic representation of People's Poland's achievements during the 40th 
anniversary of the Hitlerite aggression; 3) provide a see mlngly generous coverage 
for an atheistic socialist state; 4) eliminate all crowd scenes and signs of 
upsurge of enthusiasm among the population.28
Such guidelines are subsequently translated into specific recommendations and 
directives by the Secretary and staff of the PUWP Central Committee Department 
of Press, Radio, and Television. The Secretary then transmits these directives 
to the editors of the central news agencies, the editors of Party organs, and the 
directors of radio and television during special briefings. In addition torelsyiny 
these guidelines at the briefings, the Secretary answers questions and criticises 
those who have failed to implement satlsfeetorlly earlier directives.
Insight into the specificity of the directives issued at tlm m  briefings is 
gained from a translated draft at proposed instructions e* press coversgs of lege 
John Paul ll's visit to leleadu This document van geeidJied by tht Pm  C M t M l  
Conit to*'■ D*p*rt».nt of tfco Pro*., RMi«t M i  ttlOVtnion in Hoy I W k  tt* 4tAfl 
w o  int.MoA lot M t . r M l  l>|>ffOO U i M i  tfao followll* M iW f i t Off
r«,rintM vorb.ti* t t m  D m  t r oM Ut lo* of th. propo.M i M t V M t l O M i 1*
’ II
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c. On the first day of the visit*June 2- the 
morning end afternoon papers will publish a photograph of the Pope, information on the start of the visit, a biography and 
commentary from PAP, while the party press will not print any picture, but solely in* formation, a biography, and a commentary 
from PAP*(The Catholic Press will be supervised according to the censorship regulations in force).
b. CAF * all photographs connected with the Pope*s stay in Poland and submitted for publication in the lay press will be 
approved by the PUWP Central Committee Department of Press, Radio, and Television.The remaining photographs will be approved
for publication in the normal course of censor* ship in consultation with the department.
c. A list of possible titles and subjects for 
articles about the Pope will be submittedto PUWP Department separately.
d. It is suggested that photoreporting appear 
only in Perspektywy * on the meeting in Belvedere and in fraakrol - on the erein Auschwlts (1.5 volumn in sise).
e. It is expected that toward the end of, and immediately following the Papal visit to Poland, particular emphasis (to be described in another document) will be put by the press on international events, such as the signing of Salt II Agreement.
Tie limited coverage of the Papal visit, the absence of crowd scenes, and 
the immediate shift to other major news items after the visit suggests that 
tkt aforementioned directives were implemented by the mass media.
While central agemc;; editors and Party organ editors in chief meet with
the P W P  C.C, Department of Press, Radio, and Television, foreign news editors
meet with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, agricultural, 
indeetrial, and cultural affaire editors receive guidelines from the relevant
siiiii fc *. ' a,. ilfe, 1 - ’1 r.
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government ministry and concurrently obtain clearance for their articles. Lendvai 
postulates that editors of weeklies obtain guidelines from the Deputy Secretary 
of the Department of Press, Radio, and Television.
Lendvai further postulates that the central directives are transmitted 
to local editors at regular local media briefings. The provincial Secretary of 
the Department of Press, Radio, and Television, bound by the principle of democratic 
centralism, relays the relevant directives to the regional mass media directors. 
Bufek adds that these meetings are also used to Initiate the word of mouth system 
of Informing the public of upcoming changes. Clearly, the directives system sets 
the tone for the entire mass media in Poland.
The use of prospective and working plans and the preparation of newspaper 
issues a day in advance facilitates propaganda campaigns and reduces the probability 
of sensitive material being broadcast. While developing prospective media plena, 
high-ranking officials decide how much anti-imperialist propaganda will be printed. 
Working plans help coordinate strategies of slowly informing the public of forth­
coming changes.
Since newspapers In Poland do not compete with each other but are allocated 
a circulation else by the central planners, it is likely that issues of newspapers 
are leisurely prepared in advance like the CPSU*s Pavda . Hendrick Smith found 
that the "next days Prayda is ready a day early." "The page proofs are laid out, 
meaning that stories have been put into type two or three days before and gone 
over with a fine tooth comb."'*® The early preparation of a newspaper enables the 
editors to eliminate typographical errors and insure that articles follow the 
Party line. Articles which do not follow the Party’s line or reveal sensitive 
information will be replaced by an article from a ready supply kept by the editors 
for last minute changes.
160
CENSORSHIP
Censorship in the Polish ness media begins before the journalist writes an 
article. After rigorous training at the University of Warsaw, ideological 
indoctrination, direct guidelines, and practical experience, the journalist 
probably writes an article from the Marxist-Lenlnlst perspective. The journalist 
knows that criticism of the leading role of the Party, socialism, Poland’s 
allies, or patriotic Ideals is taboo.31 He knows, from directives relayed to him 
by his editors, how to treat certain issues and what Issues not to treat at all.
When directives are not clear, he knows he must ask his superiors for clarification. 
Indeed, the journalist is encouraged to follow these directives by the aforementioned 
positive and negative incentives.
Although foreign press transmltals leaving Poland are no longer censored, 
foreign reporters engage in self-censorship. Poland expels foreign correspondents 
for transmitting false information. The Polish government decides what is false 
information and there is no appeal to its decision. The foreign journalist will 
not risk expulsion, eribdtassment, and loss of coverage for his newspaper, by 
transmitting information which the Polish authorities might regard as hostile.
He will doctor his reports.
Censorship is also facilitated by the Party's organs and the central news 
agencies. These organs distribute ready to print articles to the local press.
For example, Politburo members submit their speeches to their colleagues for 
review. Upon Politburo approval, the speech is given to PAP for verbatim dis­
tribution. At Party meetings and Congresses, special editorial comissions 
prepare reports and other materials for distribution by PAP.
Given the Party's personnel policies, recommendations and directives, and self- 
censorship, Susek argues that state censorship plays only a subsidiary function.3*
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Tomass Halinkowskl, an emigre TV journalist in London, substantiated Busek's 
argument when he stated: "There is no censorship in Polish Television. The
control system is reliable and staffed by trusted people making it unnecessary."^
State censorship is used primarily to monitor the non-PUWP press, although Party 
organs may be censored during political crises.
The Central Office of Press, Publications, and Spectacles Control (COPPSC} 
is responsible for eliminating from the non-PUWP mass media any materials which 
discredits the regime . ^  Its offices on Hies Street in Warsaw and the provinces 
are headed by a chairman and vice-chairman. The chairman and vice-chairman 
are assisted by a Director of Press, Books, and Performances and the Director of 
Analysis and Training. The size of the staff of censors varies depending on local 
workload.
The censors are guided in their work by a manual entitled Directives and 
Recommendations which contains all censorship regulations. This manual is per­
iodically updated through Notes of Information bulletins which lists new Information 
to be kept out of the news, warnings on current issues, and cancellations of old 
regulations. The censors also keep records of their intervention*' • From their censors* 
records, COPPSC prepares various information bulletins: red information bulletins
reproduce censored texts, brown information bulletins discuss the main tendencies 
of the materials withdrawn from publication, and yellow Information bulletins 
report on the censored information in the Catholic press.
Host censors are women. COPPSC recruits with the argument that some form of 
censorship has always existed in every political system. A former censor during 
an Interview with Solidarity Ifcekly said that many censors view themselves as pro­
fessional soldiers or guards whose job is to protect socialism and the leading role 
of the Party. Others view themselves as chess players engaged in a battle of wit
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against the journalist. The interviewee also stated that censors do not get 
emotionally involved in their work. They simply perform their tasks without 
thinking about them because otherwise they may suffer qudfcs of conscience which 
would Interfere in their work.
Newly recruited censors undergo rigourous training for about two weeks.
They learn about what the public must not learn by studying the manual of 
Recommendations and Directives. The censors also perform practical exercises.
They censor a sample text and then compare their work with that of a skilled 
censor on the same text. The new recruits also study numerous examples of 
censored texts.
The trained censor continues to rely on his manual and its updates for 
guidance. The censor is further guided by topical instructions and weekly 
meetings. The censor occasionally receives topical instructions from the 
P W P  C.C. Department of Press, Radio, and Television \ the Ministry of Porelgn 
Affairs; and the Government Spokesman. An example of a topical instruction Issued 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the directive to eliminate all references 
to Zdl Amin's erection of a statue of Hitler so as not to jepordlte current 
relations with Uganda. 36 During the weekly meetings, censors are warned 
about upcoming issues; such as how to edit reviews of the ten, At JtoskLa. movie 
debut. Censors are reminded at these meetings to work collectively when in doubt 
about a text.
. •>"There is no subject in a communist country which is not granted considerable 
political significance by the censors."^7 Official COPPSC documents, smuggled out 
of Poland by former employee Tomass Strsysewski, show that not only state secrets, 
information about internal political problems, and Poland's allies are protected 
by state censorship but much insignificant information as well. Verbatim examples
taken Iron COPPSC's aanual evidence thie fact:38
1. In School NO. 80 in Gdansk, a harmful substance emitted by the putty to 
seal the windows was noticed. The school has been temporarily closed.No information whatsoever may be published about this subject.
2. All information about food poisoning and epidemics affecting large 
groups of people, especially in important plants, and food poisoning in factory canteens, holiday centers, and summer colonies is banned.
3. All obituaries, advertisements, and announcements about meetings in cemeteries, at monuments, and memorial sites planned by former soldiers of the Home Army and other right-wing organisations that participated in the Warsaw Uprising, are to be withheld.
4. No information is to be disclosed about special pensions granted by the Prime Minister to certain persons.
5. No information should be published about the annual coffee consumptionin our country in order to eliminate all possibilities of calculating the 
amount of coffee which is re-exported.
6. All criticism of income and social policies Including wage claims, is forbidden. This also refers to social services such as pensions, grants, 
leaves of absences, and health care.
7. Information concerning Poland's purchase of licenses from the capitalist countries is to be eliminated from the mass media.
The items to be suppressed from the media also support * the earlier *tg«eat 
on the conminlst conception of news. Information about food poisonings, the 
activities of non-communists, or unethical trade practices do not emphasise 
Poland's economic and political development and would undermine Poland's propa­
ganda image as a prosperous, healthy, and self-sufficient state. "Such articles 
would undermine the Party's attempt through advocacy journalism, themes, and 
pictures to cumulatively compensate for obvious shortcomings the Polish people 
see in their daily lives." "These articles would not facilitate the long-term 
subliminal effect on the Polish instinct of national pride and collective 
identification with national achievement."^
Besides outrightly suppressing material, the censor may
alter it or add fabrications to materials. Solidarity
W m m i t i y 1« Interviewee mentioned a case where an author was
upset by the censor's alterations of his article, so they
both sat down and rewrote It together. "The writer Jersy
Surdykowskl complained to an English journalist that in his
article on the August events in Gdansk, the censor Invented
characters saying such things as, "People of Gdansk, think
what you are doing! No ships are being built the yards
40will be idle." u
The lies and fabrications Invented to cover up e m b a r r ­
assing events or conceal government actions are Incredible.
One example Is sufficient. "In the coastal cities work 
stoppages and slowdowns occurred at the end of 1973, then In 
Spring and July 1974 with over 8,000 shipbuilders striking.
The official media at first denied reports of dock strikes 
but stated "that some difficulties had been caused by rain 
in July."41
The Party's control of the mass media through directives 
and censorship can fail when subjected to mass pressure as 
occurred in 1956-57 and 1980-81. In 1956, the already growing 
aversion of the Polish population to the totalitarian Polish 
State was rapidly fueled by Khruschev's secret speech. The 
sudden call for increased freedom and the abolition of c e n s o r ­
ship by the population and some party leaders forced the
media control me ch an ism s to collapse. Although many called 
for the abolition of censorship, most J o u r n a l i s t 8 stopped 
short of calling for the abolition of socialist* o x  the o v e r ­
throw of the party since they were aware of ge opolitical 
realities. Soon after being placed into power, however, 
Gomutka began to reverse the li beralisation trends fostered 
by the Polish October so that by 1968 jounalists again were 
complaining of excessive censorship.
Similarly in 1980, the spontaneous and rapid growth of 
Solidarity undermined many of the Party's controls on 
society and a great liberalisation ensued. The Krakow Central 
Committee, for example, agreed to appoint Maclej Ssumowskl 
as editor of the Gaseta Krakowaka on his condition of not 
being required to serve on the Central Committee. This gave 
Ssumowskl a great deal of independence.
"Under his editorship Gaseta K r a k o w s k a . though owing 
its primary allegiance to the Communist Party in Poland, 
carried articles highly critical of the government and Party, 
printed views of distinguished Independent non-Party writers 
and was on the constant lookout for examples of corruption of 
Communist Party o f f i c i a l s . When the Party regained control 
of the political environment through the imposition of martial 
law, it quickly removed Maclej Ssumowskl and suspended the 
Krakow Central Committee.
f
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The P a r t y ’s control over the mass media follows from 
its embrace of Marxism-Leninism. For the PUWP, Marxism- 
Leninism is the sole scientific theory o t  social d e v e l o p ­
ment. All other theories are inco rr ec1, and since they are 
Incorrect they should not be circulated in society. The 
Party controls the mass media by placing loyal Individuals 
in key positions within the mass medial guiding the massftedia 
through recommendstions and directives on how to handle the 
news; and suppressing information which does not meet its 
s t a n d a r d s .
ly controlling the mass media, the Party believes it 
will eventually rid its society of old values, replace them 
with socialist valuee and thereby bring prosperity to 
Poland* Intuitively, the Party Seems to bo working against 
i t a a l f * Approaching all probiota frit one pereepective stifle# 
the imagin«tiea» H a l t s  its daveloptant and axprtasion.
Surely the problems of the mdoern world are ton complex and 
varlad to be solved form a single perspective!
As Poles often hear news reports from other sources, 
such as Radio Fret Europe, they are aware that the Party 
oftentimes does not report information accurately. C u m u ­
latively, many Polaa have become cynical about official 
information, and this cynicism often hinders the implement­
ation of the Party's policies.
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Yet, the Party continues to control Information In 
Poland because It fears that allowing greater freedom 
of Information will lead to the curtailment of or the
removal of its power, Indeed, the Party has much to fear. 
History has shown that oppressive regimes are eventually 
overthrown. This fact Is also one of the fundamental
precepts of Marxism
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CONCLUSION
Despite .it v^ua challenge* * t8 laglti«acy and 
power as represented by the numerous worker and Intellectual 
protests, the PUWP has been able to ma intain Itself in power.
The reason that the PUWP maintains power is because it is 
effectively the Polish State. It is the supreme public power 
within the largely sovereign Polish political entity. Without 
a state, the Polish people would be exposed to the dangers of 
external aggression and Internal choas. None of the protests 
effectively challenged the foundations of the Polish State.
Only the establishment of a new state would remove the PUWP 
from power.
All states, communist or n o n - c o m m u n i s t , have become 
increasingly involved in the socio-economic matters of their 
people as a result of the general process of change which 
has produced modern industrial society. The principal in­
strument of change occured in the mastering of new technological 
processes and in the application of modern science to the 
satisfaction of social needs. The lives of residents of states 
are increasingly influenced by state actions and they lncrease- 
ingly rely on state services. The extent of state Involvement 
in the socio-economic affairs of the people of socialist 
countries is much greater because the state controls the o w n e r ­
ship, production, and distribution of goods and services whereas 
these tasks are performed through market forces in capitalist 
societies. Thus more so than the capitalistic state, the 
socialist state permeates its society and effectively controls
The PUWP i8 effectively the Polish state and permeates 
Polish society and uses the state to Maintain power. The 
PUHP, as supreme public power, uses the military and internal 
police to fight external and Internal challenges to its power. 
Through its control of the Sejm, the symbol of the will of the 
Polish people, the Party legitimises its policies by stamping 
them with the seal of the approval of the Polish people. The 
Party then implements these policies through the State admin* 
istration. It could use its own bureaucracy to implement these 
policies but the Party*s use of the State ad mi ni str at ion reduce 
the biatantness of its power, shields it from criticism, and 
makes Poland similar to the other nations of the world. The 
State administration is really the Party ad ministration since 
it is permeated with party members.
The Polish judiciary, as other judiciaries Insures that 
the laws of the Polish State are followed and punishes those 
who break the law. Thus the symbol of the Polish judiciary, 
objectively punishing those who violate the law, contributes 
to the P a r t y 9s maintenance of power.
Just as the Party controls the State effectively making 
the Party and the State one, so it controls other political, 
social, and economic organisations to insure that there are no 
challenges to its power. The mass media is a p a r t i c u l a r l y  
Important organisation which the Party controls as it 
enables the Party to mobilise the Polish po pulation for the im­
plementation of its policies and to socialise the Polish 
people politically into accepting its rule.
Stewart Stevens, in The P o l e s , has estlasted that, aside 
from the military, about 100,000 Poles, mostly PUMP members, 
govern Poland today. Mllovan DJilas argues that these 100,000 
Poles are the effective owners of state property in Poland.
As nffective owners of state property, they command an economy 
which produced 2.5 percent of the world's Industrial production, 
placing Poland in 10th place "as to volume of industrial p r o ­
duction" in 1975. Surely, an economy which ls^world leader in 
the production of shipping vessels, refined cooper, sulphur, 
and many other goods, can provide sufficient economic Incentives 
to motivate 100,000 Poles to maintain the status quo. Maintaining 
the status quo will enable these hies to continue enjoying their 
privileged position and to try to pass these benefits onto their 
o f f s p r i n g .
Indeed, the Party's State apparatus, staffed with devoted 
Individuals, is most effective in controlling society when the 
masses, unlike Itself, are unorganised. However, when the masses 
themselves unite, through an event which threatens their per­
sonal lives, they are able to thwart many of the Party's c o n ­
trols through their collective strength. Thus in 1956, 1970,
1976, and 1980, the Polish masses temporarily united when their 
standard of living was threatened by the Party's economic 
policies. The Party apparatus was set back and forced to make 
some concessions. let, when the mass organisation began to 
break down, and the people went back to pursuing their daily 
lives, the Party, through its apparatus, was able to reapply 
individual pressures and regain control of the political e n v i r ­
onment.
Increasingly, hovtr , the Polish workers, and other 
segments of Polish society, are realising that if they remain 
organised, they will be better able to press the Party for 
reforms. Historically, the workers have realised that only 
through collective strength were they able to obtain c o n ­
cessions from the Party and that only through collective 
strength will they obtain concessions in the future. The 
worker's first attempt at establishing a permanent organisation 
to bargain with the Party, the NSZZ Solidarity, failed because 
they deluded themselves into believing that they were too strong 
to be eliminated by the Party. Martial law taught the workers 
a harsh lesson. The workers have learned their lesson well 
and the next "Solidarity" they form will be even more form­
idable than the first and will be able to more effectively press 
the PUWP for long overdue reforms.
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